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RIGHTS AND JUDGES IN A 
DEMOCRACY: A NEW CANADIAN 
VERSIONt 
Paul C. Weiler* 
On both sides of the Canadian-American b,order, the last dec-
ade has been an exciting time for those interested in the peren-
nial problem of what should be the role of courts in protecting 
fundamental rights in a democracy. The United States has wit-
nessed a remarkable flourishing of constitutional theory reflect-
ing on the appropriate scope and method of its long-established 
institution of judicial review. 1 In Canada, public life has been 
absorbed in a debate over the even more basic issue of whether 
Canadian judges should have any such constitutional role at all. 
Canadians sought a constitutionally entrenched Charter of 
Rights not just for its own sake, but also as part of a larger effort 
at constitutional renewal. The hope was that such a Charter 
would preserve a united Canada in the face of the serious threat 
posed by French Canadian nationalism within a potentially in-
dependent Quebec. 2 In this Article, I comment on those features 
t Thomas M. Cooley Lecture delivered at the University of Michigan Law School on 
Oct. 31, 1983. 
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; former MacKenzie King Professor of Cana-
dian Studies, Harvard University. 
1. Within the voluminous literature of the last few years, there exist some notable 
book-length treatments of this subject. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORD-
ING TO LAW (1981); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
(1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
2. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is Part I (§§ 1-34) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. At the request of the Canadian Parliament, the United Kingdom Parliament, by 
means of the Canada Act, 1982, formally enacted this law in order to incorporate the 
existing Canadian constitutional documents (in particular, the British North America 
Act of 1867, as amended since then) in the new Constitution Act, 1982, and to create a 
new domestic procedure for amending the Canadian Constitution in the future (§§ 38-
49). The Canada Act, 1982, thereupon terminated the future authority of the United 
Kingdom Parliament over Canada. 
The best succinct analysis of the legal background to, and potential meaning of, each 
of the provisions of the new constitution, including the Charter, is P. HOGG, THE CANADA 
ACT, 1982 ANNOTATED (1982). The best scholarly account of the historical, political and 
legal aspects of the constitutional struggle is AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM, DEMOC-
RACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION ACT (K. Banting & R. Simeon ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited 
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of the Canadian debate and its denouement that are noteworthy 
within the Canadian context, as well as those that illustrate 
some of the universal themes of constitutional theory. 
The first question that might occur to an American is why 
there might even be a heated debate about putting the people's 
rights into the constitution. 3 In fact, this proposal was strongly 
favored by the Canadian public:' It had a powerful champion in 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who considered the Charter the 
major legacy of his fifteen years in power. Opposition to the 
Charter, however, came from almost all the provincial govern-
ment leaders, who voiced in practical, down-to-earth terms the 
theoretical criticisms developed by a number of serious constitu-
tional scholars. 11 
The source of the provincial leaders' concern was the same as 
the source of the Charter's popular attraction: observation of 
Canada's next-door neighbor's two centuries of experience with 
constitutionalized rights. The lesson that Canadians gleaned 
from the American experience with the institutiqn is that the 
as AND No ONE CHEERED). A fine journalistic account of the critical events from the 
spring of 1980 to the spring of 1982 is R. SHEPPARD & M. VALPY, THE NATIONAL DEAL 
(1982). 
3. As background to this account, one should know that in 1960 Canada did achieve a 
Bill of Rights. See W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN B1LL OF RIGHTS (Rev. ed. 1975). This 
legal statement of the rights of Canadians was, however, contained in a simple Act of 
Parliament. Consequently, it was theoretically repealable in the same way and was appli-
cable only to federal, not provincial, government action; all of which led the Supreme 
Court of Canada to denude the Bill of any significant legal force. The proponents of a 
constitutionally entrenched Charter saw this new legal status as the solution to deficien-
cies in the old Bill of Rights. See Tarnopolsky, The Historical and Constitutional Con-
text of the Proposed Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1981, at 169 (1981) (presenting as good a statement as any of this 
position). 
4. Although American commentators living in Canada often depict Canadians as 
more concerned with order than liberty, see E. FRIEDENBERG, DEFERENCE TO AUTHORITY: 
THE CASE OF CANADA (1980); Kaufman, Canada: An American Discovers Its Difference, 
N.Y. Times, May 15, 1983 (Magazine), at 61, the Canadian public actually strongly sup-
ported the proposed Charter. The Gallup Poll of July 1980 disclosed that 91 % of 
Canadians supported a Charter of Rights and only two percent were opposed. See D. 
HOFFMAN, WHo's AFRAID OF A BILL OF RIGHTS? 1 n.2 (1981). Another public opinion sur-
vey in April 1981, taken at the height of the federal-provincial battle about constitu-
tional change, found that 84 % of all respondents still favored the Charter and 63 % 
strongly supported it. This proportion was considerably more than even the proportion 
supporting patriation of the Canadian Constitution from Britain. See Ackerman & Char-
ney, Canada at the Constitutional Crossroads, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 129 n.31 (1982). 
5. Among the best pre-Charter critiques of constitutionalizing rights in Canada are 
Russell, A Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 109 (1969); 
Schmeiser, The Case Against Entrenchment of A Canadian Bill of Rights, 1 DALHOUSIE 
L.J. 15 (1973); and Smiley, The Case Against the Charter of Rights, 2 CAN. J. PoL. Sci. 
277 (1969). A post-Charter piece in the same vein is Macdonald, Postscript and Prel-
ude-the Jurisprudence of the Charter: 8 Theses, 4 SuP. CT. L. REv. 321 (1982). 
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merit of a constitutional Charter of Rights depends less on the 
abstract values expressed in the legal document than on the so-
lution to the practical problem of translating those principles 
into sensible real-life judgments. Is it better to rely on an infor-
mal sense of self-restraint on the part of elected political leaders 
or on enforcement of a written constitution by an independent 
judiciary? A comparison of the records in the two countries by 
no means indicated that, even without constitutional backing, 
the rights of Canadians were more in jeopardy than those of 
Americans. 6 
Disagreement over the Charter has been a major theme in the 
constitutional controversy that has engaged the Canadian feder-
ation for the last two decades,7 a controversy that has called into 
• 
6. A nice recent illustration of this point concerns the death penalty, which has, in 
the last decade or two, raised popular emotions on both sides of the border. The United 
States Supreme Court has backed and filled on the question of whether and when capital 
punishment is constitutionally permissible. Compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Notwithstanding the numerous obsta-
cles the Court has placed in its path, the death penalty is gaining momentum in the 
United States. See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 
(1982). The Supreme Court of Canada refused even to countenance the argument that 
such a substantive moral issue might be the subject of serious judicial scrutiny under the 
"cruel and unusual punishment" clause in our statutory Bill of Rights. See Miller v. The 
Queen, [1977) 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.) (one of the series of decisions that drew almost all the 
teeth from that document and helped propel us towards constitutional entrenchment). 
But at the very time that the Court was giving us this hands-off verdict, the Canadian 
Parliament was voting to repeal the death penalty, see P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 46, a 
position it has maintained since then in the face of substantial popular opinion to the 
contrary. See Special Report: Hanging, MACLEAN's, Oct. 8, 1984, at 48. 
I do not suggest that this type of comparison is decisive as to the worth of the consti-
tutional rights. One could as easily argue that differences in both the nature of the crime 
problem in the two countries and the resulting public mood made this an easier issue for 
Canadian politicians to handle without constitutional restraints, and that with the addi-
tion of the latter the Canadian polity might do even better than it has. My point in this 
example is that one cannot resolve that question by a priori reasoning about the value of 
the ideals expressed in a proposed constitutional document. The issue ultimately turns 
on more practical, institutional considerations. 
7. The manner in which the specific issue of constitutionalizing rights was confronted 
in Canada tended to reinforce the division between the two positions. See generally R. 
SHEPPARD & M. V ALPY, supra note 2. In his final effort to solve the issue, Prime Minister 
Trudeau introduced a resolution in the Canadian Parliament in October 1980 that would 
lead to patriation of the Canadian Constitution with both a domestic amending formula 
and a Charter of Rights. This Resolution was referred to a Joint Committee of the House 
of Commons and the Senate of Canada to hear representations from the public and to 
consider revisions to the initial proposals. 
In the Joint Committee, consideration of the Charter focused almost exclusively on its 
substantive content. The tenor of the discussion and movement in this forum indicated 
that the reach of the Charter had to be expanded and its language tightened up to insure 
that no one's rights were left uncovered. The placement of unequal treatment on account 
of age or disability on the same constitutional plane as race or religion in § 15 of the 
Charter, with little or no regard to whether any such addition made sense in institutional 
terms, exemplified this concern. 
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question all aspects of our governmental arrangements. The 
seemingly endless debate climaxed in a final Conference of First 
Ministers in November 1981. The result was an Accord on the 
Charter-as well as a formula for patriation and amendment of 
the Constitution-embodying a compromise that most Canadian 
commentators considered to be a distasteful political expedient 
worked out in the wee hours of the morning.8 I suggest, however, 
that Canadians in fact devised a rather ingenious alternative 
both to the British parliamentary sovereignty which we inher-
ited and to the American practice of judicial supremacy over 
fundamental rights which has so long beguiled us. 
Before describing this solution and enumerating its virtues, let 
us examine in the Canadian context the perennial and universal 
dilemma of rights and judges in a democracy. The conflict has 
its roots in the fact that in a society civilized enough to adopt 
and live by a Charter of Rights, the kinds of cases likely to arise 
under such a document rarely have clear-cut answers, as a mat-
ter of either moral principle or legal interpretation. Thus, by 
putting these rights in its constitution, a nation in fact transfers 
the final authority for settling inherently contestable dilemmas 
about the appropriate limits of public action from the political 
to the judicial branch of government. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGE RIGHTS 
Illustrations of the moral controversy in real-life constitu-
tional cases abound; for example, the abortion issue has 
produced constitutional causes celebres in the United States, ' 
West Germany, and elsewhere.9 I will focus on the language 
The Government of Canada, consistent with Canadian constitutional tradition, sought 
to achieve the consent of the provinces to this constitutional package through confer-
ences of Federal and Provincial ministers both before and after the October Resolution. 
In this forum, the First Ministers focused on the grand question of whether there should 
be constitutional entrenchment at all. They paid little or no attention to the content of 
particular rights (language being the one exception, for reasons to be noted shortly) and 
very little to the suggestion that some rights might more appropriately and safely be 
entrenched than others. 
8. Prime Minister Trudeau responded to a final question at a press conference asking 
him what he thought of the recent Accord: " 'You are asking me now if I consider it a 
success? No, I consider it an abject failure!' He abruptly stood up and walked hurriedly 
outside into the rain and his waiting black limousine, leaving the riddle behind him." R. 
SHEPPARD & M. VALPY, supra note 2, at 322. 
9. While the United States Supreme Court struck down restrictive American abor-
tion laws, holding that they unduly infringed on a woman's freedom of choice, see Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the West German Constitutional Court found the liberalized 
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issue10 for it has been as central to the Canadian experience with 
rights and constitutions as race has been in the United States. 
In fact, securing minority language rights was the principal mo-
tivation for Prime Minister Trudeau's making the Charter the 
centerpiece of his project for constitutional renewal of Canadian 
federalism. 
The peculiar features of the language issue in Canada are viv-
idly illustrated in our most famous civil rights controversy, the 
Manitoba School Crisis of the 189O's. u In that case, the French 
Catholic minority asserted its right to have "separate but equal" 
education in its own schools funded out of the public coffers. 
The French considered oppressive the English-dominated pro-
vincial . legislature's attempt to force all students, including 
French Catholics, into a single, "integrated" public school sys-
tem.12 Paradoxically, the Manitoba minority lost that struggle13 
German Jaw unconstitutional because it gave insufficient protection to the fetus' right to 
life, see Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 39 Bundesverfassungsger-
icht [BVerfG] 1. See generally Kommers, Abortion and Constitution: United States and 
West Germany, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 255 (1977). The Parliamentary Committee also con-
sidered the subject of abortions in its deliberations about the content of the Canadian 
Charter. Because there were powerful interest groups on each side of the question, how-
ever, this was one issue as to which the parliamentarians saw discretion to be the better 
part of valor and left the relevant provisions of the Charter oblique on the matter. Both 
sides have now propelled the controversy into the judicial arena. See infra notes 84-85. 
10. The best overview of the language issue in Canada is R. WARDHAUGH, LANGUAGE 
AND NATIONHOOD: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (1983). My sketch of the problem here 
draws on an earlier piece, Weiler, Writing a Constitution to Protect Minorities: The 
Canadian Experience, in MINORITIES: COMMUNITY AND lnENTITY 315 (C. Fried ed. 1983). 
11. The best short account of the Manitoba School Crisis is T. BERGER, FRAGILE 
FREEDOMS 58-92 (1981). The technical legal issues are explored in D. SCHMEISER, C1v1L 
LIBERTIES IN CANADA 158-69 (1964). A fine book-length study is P. CRUNICAN, PRIESTS 
AND POLITICIANS; MANITOBA SCHOOLS AND THE ELECTION OF 1896 (1974). 
12. This testifies to the differences between race and language. While each consti-
tutes an external badge of identity-thus the basis for invidious discrimina-
tion-language poses a rather more profound problem. Not only does it shape the way an 
individual thinks and views the world, language is also an inherently social activity. It is 
not enough to have a constitutional right to speak the language of one's choice. One 
needs to have listeners who can understand. 
Those who support linguistic equality, then, are not simply against adverse negative 
treatment on account of one's mother tongue, but also for the positive social conditions 
within which one's language and culture can survive and flourish. The key vehicle for 
resisting assimilation into a "language-blind society" is education, through which not 
just the language but also the history, culture, and sense of group identity are transmit-
ted to the young. I should note that in Canadian constitutional history, there was an 
intimate connection between language and religion in the understanding of minority 
rights, and that is why I refer throughout to the French-Catholic minority. 
13. The initial response of the French Catholics in Manitoba was to try to assert 
their constitutional rights. The narrow construction which the British Privy Council 
placed on this legal restraint on Parliamentary sovereignty, see City of Winnipeg v. Bar-
rett, 1892 A.C. 445 (P.C.) (Can.), however, frustrated this tack. Despite this defeat, the 
Privy Council found that Canada's highly centralized, quasi-federal constitution also 
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largely because Canada's French Catholic Prime Minister, Wil-
fred Laurier, considered it essential to defend the principle of 
provincial autonomy just then emerging within the Canadian 
federal regime. Laurier believed that this constitutional princi-
ple was vital to the Quebecois (the French in Quebec), because it 
would keep the authority over education and other areas of pub-
lic life in the hands of the provincial government in Quebec City, 
the only government in North America whose constituency was 
predominantly French. 
In these fateful events of nearly a century ago lie the seeds of 
the modern Canadian dilemma. In fact, throughout the 1970's 
Canada witnessed an eerie replay of the contest between the 
strategy of individual constitutional rights as the ideal technique 
for protecting the French Canadian minority-the position of 
Trudeau and his federal government in Ottawa-and the alter-
native of provincial rights (or even more radical forms of 
Quebecois nationalism)-now identified with Quebec Premier 
Rene Levesque and his Parti Quebecois.14 
The virtues of the individual rights strategy are evident: 
through a constitutional guarantee of individual language rights, 
Canada could undo its past injustice towards the French Cana-
dian minority as exemplified by the Manitoba School case. Such 
measures would, it was hoped, avert the serious threat to Cana-
dian unity posed by the coexistence of two linguistically separate 
Canadas, the French in Quebec and the English everywhere 
else. 15 As Trudeau has argued since his days as a constitutional 
provided a protective jurisdiction of the central government against denial of minority 
language education rights by the provinces. See Brophy v. Attorney-General of Mani-
toba, 1895 A.C. 202 (P.C.). Charles Tupper, the English Protestant leader of the then-
incumbent Canadian Government, introduced legislation in Ottawa to roll back Mani-
toba's new education policy, but this measure was opposed by Laurier's Liberals. The 
Liberals forced and won an election on the issue in 1896 and negotiated a compromise 
with the Manitoba Premier which effectively denied the French-Catholics their own 
schools in that province. 
14. The best treatment in English of the ferment in Quebec is K. McRoBERTS & D. 
PoSGATE, QUEBEC: SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL CRISIS (Rev. ed. 1980). A succinct state-
ment of the issues is A. BERNARD, WHAT DoES QUEBEC WANT? (1978). There is a nice 
summary of the contrasting positions of Trudeau and Levesque in TRENT, Common 
Ground and Disputed Territory, in MusT CANADA FAIL? 139 (R. Simeon ed. 1977). 
15. While French Canadians were 25.7% of the Canadian population in 1971, they 
were 80';,, of the population of Quebec, and just 4.4% of the rest of Canada. Indeed, if 
one views the 190,000 Francophones in Northwest New Brunswick and the 270,000 in 
Eastern Ontario as part of a single Quebec and "contact regions," Francophones com-
prise only 1.5% of the rest of Canada (which constitutes two-thirds of the Canadian 
population as a whole). The population figures in this note and in most of those that 
follow are drawn from R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, THE DEMOLINGUISTIC SITUATION IN 
CANADA (1982), in particular the comprehensive census tables in the book's Appendix. 
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law professor in Montreal, 16 only if effective legal guarantees 
against unfriendly provincial governments solidify the precari-
ous situation of the French language outside Quebec will the 
Quebecois be able to consider all of Canada their homeland, 
throughout which they can travel and live with confidence in 
governmental support of their linguistic and cultural heritage. 
Although entrenchment of his Official Languages policy at the 
federal level was an important constitutional goal for Trudeau, 
his major aim was to prod provincial governments to provide ed-
ucation rights to their French Canadian minorities. 
It required the election in the late 1970's of a separatist gov-
ernment in Quebec for English Canada finally to accept this po-
sition.17 By that time, though, bitter opposition to these federal 
remedial measures had emerged within Quebec. Sophisticated 
Quebecois felt that this legal lifeline had come a century too late 
to make the French language viable outside their province. They 
believed that the tug of assimilation in an urban industrialized 
society would inevitably trump whatever legal rights were writ-
ten into a constitution.16 They were also concerned that the 
price of using a constitution in the quixotic quest for linguistic 
equality would be reciprocal limitations on the freedom of action 
of the French inside Quebec. 
This issue was not merely symbolic in the 1970's. The 
Quebecois were alarmed over the incipient decline· in the French 
proportion of the Quebec population, especially in Montreal, the 
flagship of French Canada.19 This gloomy trend was attributable 
16. See his collected essays in P.E. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS 
(1968). A position paper of his, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, A NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING 
(1977), expressed the same point of view. 
17. Nevertheless, there remained the ever present possibility of English backlash, as 
exhibited in the air traffic control dispute of 1976. See S. BoRINS, THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
SKIES (1983). 
18. See R. Beaugot, A Demographic View of Canadian Language Policy, 5 CAN. Pue. 
PoL'Y 16 (1979); GUINDON, The Modernization of Quebec, in MODERNIZATION AND THE 
CANADIAN STATE 244 (1978); Vaillancourt, La Charte de la Langue Francaise du Quebec, 
4 CAN. Pue. PoL'v 284 (1978). The tug of assimilation became evident in the more elabo-
rate census data of 1971. That year, of 1,421,000 Canadians of French origin living 
outside of Quebec, 926,000 had the French language as their mother tongue and 676,000 
had French as their home language. That meant that more than one-third of the Canadi-
ans with French ancestry did not learn French as their first language in their parents' 
home and, of those who did, more than one-quarter no longer used French in their own 
home, teaching it to their children. Especially endangered species were those in Western 
Canada: 11,000 Francophones in British Columbia, 25,000 in Alberta, and 15,000 in Sas-
katchewan. While there remained 40,000 of French mother tongue in Manitoba, this was 
only 6.1 % of the provincial population, and the same stark process of assimilation had 
taken place: 8.8% of Manitobans were of French origin, but just 4.0% used it as their 
home language. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15. 
19. Jacques Henripin, the leading French Canadian demographer, looked at the de-
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to the fact that, given the choice between adopting French or 
English as a family language, at least twice as many non-En-
glish-speaking entrants to Quebec were choosing English. This 
trend was most pronounced in Montreal.2° The economic domi-
nance of the anglophone community in Quebec21 and the conse-
quent fact that proficiency in English was more advantageous to 
one's prospects than was proficiency in French22 made English 
the preferred language of the newcomers to the provlnce, and 
their children flocked to the English schools rather than to the 
French ecoles. Thus, although the individual choices were emi-
nently reasonable for each family concerned, cumulatively they 
posed a profound threat to the continuing existence of French 
language and culture in what had been considered its sole safe 
harbor in North America. 
From this situation emerged a comprehensive language policy 
in Quebec which culminated in passage of the Charter of the 
French Language in 1977. 23 A crucial feature of this provincial 
law was restriction of freedom of choice in the language of edu-
cation. 24 The established English-language school system is pre-
dining birth rate of the Quebecois and the growing tendency of immigrants to assimilate 
into the English community in Quebec and projected a drop in the French share of Que-
bec from 82.5% in 1951 to a range of 71.6%-79.2% by 2001, and in Montreal from 62% 
in 1961 to a range of 52-62% by 2001. See K. McRoBERTS & D. PosGATE, supra note 14, 
at 132-33. Naturally enough, the concerned Quebecois focused on the lower end of this 
scale. See W. Johnson, Demographics Fed the Paranoia, The Globe and Mail, Jan. 11, 
1984 at 8. 
20. Of Quebecers with an Allophone origin (meaning neither French nor English), 
27.4% had English as a mother tongue in 1971, while only 15.7% had French. See K. 
McROBERTS & D. PosGATE, supra note 14, at 132. This phenomenon occurred at a time 
when four out of five allophones would have had to opt for French just to maintain the 
balance within the province. 
21. In 1971, the average male English worker earned 28% more than the male French 
worker. See S. ARNOPOULOS & D. CLIFT, THE ENGLISH FACT IN QUEBEC 239, Table 14 
(1980). Even after controlling for human capital variables, there remained a seven per-
cent differential. See Vaillancourt, supra note 18, at 293. In any event, for purposes of 
language attractiveness to newcomers, gross disparities in income and occupation are 
likely to be influential. As if to add insult to injury, whereas in 1961 French-speaking 
Quebecers ranked 12th in average income by ethnic group in the province, ahead of only 
the Italians and native Canadians, see LESLIES, Ethnic Hierarchies and Minority Con-
sciousness in Quebec, in MusT CANADA FAIL?, supra note 14, at 107, 108, by 1971 they 
had dropped to 13th, now trailing the Italians, see A. Bernard, supra note 14, at 159. 
22. Taking the 1970 earnings of the unilingual Francophone as 100, being a bilingual 
Francophone added 40 points to one's income level. Being bilingual, however, added al-
most nothing to the Anglophone edge. That figure rose only one point, from 167 to 168. 
See Vaillancourt, supra note 18, at 292. 
23. QuE. REV. STAT. ch. C-11 (1977). In GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC, QUEBEC'S POLICY OF 
THE FRENCH LANGUAGE (1977), the Parti Quebecois spelled out the rationale of its lan-
guage policy. 
24. Sections 72 and 73 of the Charter of the French language defined the new regime 
for language of education. Another major feature of the Charter, in my view the more 
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served for the children of English-speaking Quebecers who were 
educated in the system themselves; nevertheless, children of 
newcomers to the province are barred from those schools. The 
law dictates that anyone who moves permanently to Quebec (i.e., 
for more than three years) must send his children to French 
public school, just as he would do if he were settling in France. 
Unhappily for Rene Levesque, this feature of his Charter, which 
sought to preserve the French language in Quebec, conflicted di-
rectly with the aim and content of Trudeau's constitutional 
Charter,25 which proposed to secure educational rights in Quebec 
for English Canadians as the price of comparable educational 
rights for the French in all the other provinces. 
Given the experience in the United States of states' rights (es-
pecially in the South) cast in opposition to equality for blacks, 
the notion of provincial autonomy as a strategy for protecting a 
minority group may seem ludicrous to most Americans. The tac~ 
tic, however, would appear more plausible if, in the United 
States, ninety-five percent of blacks lived in one large state, 
where they constituted eighty percent of the population, and if 
the national constitution prevented the state's government from 
taking affirmative action to redress what it considered to be the 
current impact of historic domination by the state's white mi-
nority. This hypothetical situation captures the actual situation 
of Quebec in Canada, giving rise to the major moral ambiguity 
bedeviling the Canadian quest for a constitutional Charter of 
Rights. 
I shall defer an assessment of the relative merits of the two 
constitutional visions I have sketched26 until later in this Article. 
For the moment, let this account of the bitter contest between 
important in the longer run, attempts to alter the environment within which individual 
education choices are made, in particular by requiring that French be the language of 
work in the province. Elaborate "Francization" programs now require Quebec businesses 
to make French the normal language of workplace communication, supervision, instruc-
tion, manuals, labor-management relations, etc. Supporters of the programs expect that 
when immigrants to Quebec realize that being French is a necessary condition to getting 
ahead in their jobs, they will respond by sending their children to French language 
schools. See E. MCWHINNEY, QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1960-1978, at 60-61 (1979). 
25. See Constitution Act, 1982, § 23. See generally Magnet, Minority Language Edu-
cational Rights, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 195 (1983); Tetley, Language and Education Rights 
in Quebec and Canada, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 177 (1982). 
26. I might add that essentially the same contest between the constitutional strate-
gies of individual legal rights and group self-government took place in connection with 
the native peoples of Canada. See McNeil, The Constitutional Right of the Aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada, 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 255 (1983); Sanders, The Indian Lobby, in AND 
No ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, at 301. Recently, a Report of the Special Committee of 
the House of Commons of Canada, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA (1983), has 
largely endorsed the latter approach. 
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the two foremost champions of the French Canadian minority 
serve simply as an illustration of the larger truth: in a country 
like Canada, the typical "rights" case has no single, obviously 
correct answer, but rather presents a subtle moral choice be-
tween individual claims and community needs. 
II. THE OPEN TEXTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE 
To grant that fundamental rights cases rarely have clear-cut 
moral solutions is not, of course, to imply that putting these 
rights in a constitution necessarily means expanding judicial 
power. An alternative hypothesis is that since the framers of a 
constitution commit themselves to one side or the other of the 
moral dilemma-as they seemed to do in adopting the Trudeau 
position on language-courts need only interpret and apply the 
judgments that have been made elsewhere. 27 
American constitutional scholars label this position the "inter-
pretivist thesis."28 In many respects, the Canadian experience 
provides ample corroboration for their critique. 29 As befits a doc-
ument intended to stand as a national ideal for a century or 
more, the Canadian Charter is written in broad moral terms. It 
establishes the right not to be deprived of "life, liberty and se-
curity . . . except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice"30 and "the right to the equal protection . . . and 
benefit of the law without discrimination."31 The Charter bars 
"cruel and unusual ... punishment,"32 "unreasonable search 
and seizure,"33 and arbitrary arrest and detention.34 Open-tex-
tured language such as this invites-indeed, requires-the court 
27. As Judge Skelly Wright put it: "Constitutional choices are in fact different from 
ordinary [policy] decisions. The reason is simple: the most important value choices have 
already been made by the framers of the Constitution." Wright, Professor Bickel, The 
Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 784 (1971). 
28. The most vigorous exponent of "interpretivism" is Raoul Berger. See R. BERGER 
supra note 1; see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
29. The most effective critique of interpretivism is Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981). See also J. ELY, supra note 1, at 11-41; Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest For The Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Rich-
ards, Constitutional Interpretation, History and the Death Penalty: A Book Review, 71 
CALIF. L. REV. 1372 (1983). 
30. The Constitution Act, 1982, § 7 (emphasis added). 
31. Id., § 15 (emphasis added). 
32. Id., § 12 (emphasis added). 
33. Id., § 8 (emphasis added). 
34. Id., § 9 (emphasis added). 
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to confront directly the moral controversies it presents. 
The Canadian Charter is, in fact, considerably more candid 
about this than is the American Bill of Rights. Unlike the Amer-
ican Constitution with its blanket statements of rights such as 
"freedom of speech," which have allowed some American judges 
to adopt an absolutist interpretation of their legal force, 35 the 
Canadian Charter opens with the caveat that its guarantees are 
subject to "such reasonable limits ... as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society."36 This provision qual-
ifies even rights such as language rights, which are otherwise ex-
pressed in fairly specific terms. Canada's broad limitations 
clause accords with the general approach of postwar constitution 
writers around the world37 and also accords in principle, if not in 
detail, with American constitutional jurisprudence. Experience 
has demonstrated that although in the abstract such fundamen-
tal rights as freedom of speech may seem unabridgable, in prac-
tice they must be restricted when they conflict with the rights of 
others or with the needs of the community. In the Canadian 
context, the evolution of section 1 of the Charter clearly indi-
cates that the judiciary, not Parliament, is the institution re-
sponsible for drawing the line. 38 
35. Notably Justice Hugo Black. See P. BoBBITI, supra note 1, at 25-38. 
36. Constitution Act, 1982, § 1. 
37. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights not only subjects free-
dom of expression, for instance, to such limitations "as are necessary in a democratic 
society," but also specifies that such justifications may consist of "national security, ter-
ritorial integrity or public safety, ... the prevention of disorder or crime, ... the pro-
tection of health or morals, ... the protection of the reputation or rights of others, . . . 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or . . . maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary." Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in, 
W. TARN0P0LSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COM-
MENTARY, app. 3 (1982). Similarly, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights subjects the rights of freedom of conscience and religion to legal limita-
tions "necessary ... [f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others [and] ... [f]or 
the protection of national security or of public order ... or of public health or morals." 
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 19, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in W. TARNOP0LSKY & G. BEAUDOIN, 
supra, at app. 4. 
38. Like the international conventions quoted supra note 37, the predecessors to § 1 
of the Charter, which were proposed in the abortive Victoria Charter of 1971 and in the 
Constitutional Amendment Act of 1978, contained lists of countervailing interests such 
as public safety, order, health, morals, peace and security that would justify legislative 
restriction of fundamental rights. These lists were dropped in the version proposed in 
October 1980 in favor of a reference to "such reasonable limits as are generally accepted 
in a free and democratic society with a parliamentary system of government" (emphasis 
added). That language produced an outcry from groups such as the Canadian Civil Lib-
erties Association who feared (correctly, I believe) that the Canadian courts would read 
this as endorsing the acceptability of just about any limitation duly enacted by a Cana-
dian parliament in what was a comparatively free and democratic society. The Liberal 
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If the bare language of the Charter, then, gives little legal di-
rection, a judge might attempt to go beyond the words of the 
document to discover what its authors intended when they wrote 
it. If studying the framer's intent could ever be a fruitful exer-
cise, it would surely be so in the case of the Canadian Charter, 
which, unlike the centuries-old United States Bill of Rights, is a 
contemporary document developed by officials who were thor-
oughly aware of the controversies produced by comparable con-
stitutional language just south of the border. 
Unhappily, searching for the framers' intent leads only into 
another blind alley. Even leaving aside the virtually insoluble 
questions of whose intentions are to count,39 or what the notion 
of collective intent means, what a Canadian judge would actually 
discover on such a quest would be of only limited value. The 
Canadian debate took place almost entirely on the plane of ab-
stract concepts, such as how to express the notion of equality 
before the law or what are the reasonable limits appropriate in a 
free and democratic society. The participants in the debate left 
little indication of their conceptions of what these were to mean 
in real life situations. For example, one would search in vain in 
the debates over the Charter for any serious discussion about 
how the section 2(b) guarantee of "freedom of the press""0 might 
square with competing values such as the section 11 right to a 
"fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial 
tribunal. "41 Accommodation of these two rights in the context of 
Government responded with the current language which requires that the limitations be 
"demo~strably justified" to a judiciary considering the ideals of a "free and democratic 
society" as such. See P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 9-13; Christian, The Limitation of Lib-
erty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, U. BRIT. 
CoLuM. L. REV. 105 (Charter ed. 1982). 
Comparable expansion of judicial authority at the expense of the legislature took place 
with respect to the police powers of arrest, search, and bail. These powers are now re-
strained by the Charter not just when they flout grounds and procedures "established by 
law," but also when they can be labeled "arbitrary" or "unreasonable." See Constitution 
Act, 1982, §§ 8 (search), 9 (detention), & ll(e) (bail). 
39. For example, is it the intention of the Trudeau Government which is to count, or 
is it that of the all-party Parliamentary Committee, the Canadian Parliament itself, the 
Federal-Provincial First Ministers Conference, or even the Government of the United 
Kingdom which finally passed the Canada Act? 
40. Constitution Act, 1982, § 2(b). 
41. Id., § ll(d). The major exception to that generalization is language, the distinc-
tive Canadian constitutional right whose parameters were thoroughly aired before fairly 
specific decisions were made about their scope in §§ 16-23 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
As I noted above, abortion was also a prominent subject for debate. The framers, how-
ever, failed to give any specific guidance as to whose "life, liberty and security" were to 
be protected by § 7 of the Charter, that of the woman, the fetus, or neither. See Hosek, 
Women and Constitutional Change, in AND No ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, at 280, 287-
295; cf. Borowski v. Attorney-General of Canada and Minister of Fin. of Canada, 4 
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pretrial publicity, together with review of the law of libel, ob-
scenity, and sedition, was simply left to the judiciary to work 
out. 
Perhaps Canadian judges could retreat to this final haven of 
self-restraint. If they were to assume that the current shape of 
Canadian law reflects the needs and aspirations of a "free and 
democratic society," this legal pattern would establish a bench-
mark by which to police future government action, as well as to 
scrutinize any provincial laws that radically deviated from the 
basic Canadian consensus. Yet it is fair to say that the authors 
of the Charter meant to preclude that judicial option, although 
to say this may not be a decisive argument against it. In fact, it 
was widely supposed that the Supreme Court of Canada's adop-
tion of precisely this narrow view of the statutory Bill of Rights 
was largely responsible for that document's lack of influence on 
the quality of Canadian law.42 Proponents of the new Charter 
sought to alter this attitude of judicial self-abnegation; thus, the 
drafters carefully removed any language that might support 
transplanting the so-called "frozen concepts" fallacy of the Bill 
of Rights into the new constitutional Charter. 
D.L.R.4th 112 (Sask. Q.B. 1983). 
Actually § 7 itself is a textbook illustration of the spongy quality of constitutional 
language. Its predecessor, § l(a) of the old Bill of Rights, proscribed deprivation of "life, 
liberty, and security of the person" except by "due process of law." The Charter substi-
tuted the phrase "except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Ap-
parently the intent of its authors in the Department of Justice was thereby to limit the 
scope of judicial scrutiny to matters of "fair procedure," as opposed to the "substantive 
... policy of the law in question." See P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 29. I daresay that only 
a constitutional lawyer could suppose that "fundamental justice" means fair procedure 
while "due process" encompasses substantive policy. 
42. The old Bill of Rights referred to rights which "have existed and shall continue to 
exist" (§ 1) and which are "herein recognized and declared" (§ 2). That led one wing of 
the Supreme Court to suppose that "the Bill was not concerned with 'human rights and 
fundamental freedoms' in any abstract sense, but rather with such 'rights and freedoms' 
as they existed in Canada immediately before the statute was enacted." Robertson v. 
The Queen, 41 D.L.R.2d 485, 491 (Can. 1963). From that perspective it was only natural 
to conclude, as regards the death penalty, for example, that since the latter was part of 
Canadian criminal law at the time the Bill of Rights was passed and was reaffirmed by 
Parliament in Criminal Code Amendments just a year later, it could not have been in-
tended to be "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. 
Miller v. The Queen, [1977) 2 S.C.R. 680 (Can.). See generally Tarnopolsky, The Histor-
ical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Charter, supra note 3. 
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Ill. THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 
A. The Legitimacy of Judicial Authority in a Democracy 
It was a formidable document that finally emerged in the Par-
liamentary Resolution of April 1981; a written charter contain-
ing such abstract notions as liberty, equality, fundamental jus-
tice, and the "restraints appropriate in a free and democratic 
society" would now govern Canadian political life. Ultimate re-
sponsibility for divining the meaning of these essentially moral 
concepts was passed to a Canadian judiciary and legal profession 
that had almost no experience in using them and that had in 
fact shied away from such a role under the statutory Bill of 
Rights. The debates leading up to the Charter offered the courts 
almost no guidance for resolving the specific controversies that 
they would soon confront. The one unmistakable clue in the lan-
guage and history of the Charter was that the judges in their 
inquiries should not feel bound by the current state of Canadian 
law. 
Small wonder, then, that the Parliamentary Resolution evoked 
grave concern among most provincial governments, whose con-
sent was required in order for Trudeau and his government in 
Ottawa to effect such a major constitutional change.43 Notably, 
serious objections to the Charter were raised by persons across 
the Canadian political spectrum: Allen Blakeney, the social dem-
ocratic leader from Saskatchewan; Sterling Lyon, the conserva-
tive premier of Manitoba; Rene Levesque, chief spokesman for 
Quebecois nationalism; and Peter Lougheed, the lightning rod 
for Wes tern Canadian regionalism. 44 The concerns expressed by 
these Canadian political leaders were essentially those which 
American constitutionalists would anticipate. We shall look 
closely at these provincial objections, for understanding them is 
43. This was the somewhat ambivalent verdict of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Reference re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1981). 
One majority of the judges held that as a matter of narrow constitutional law, Ottawa 
could unilaterally ask the United Kingdom government in Westminster to revise the ex-
isting Canadian Constitution. Another majority, however, said that, as a matter of broad 
constitutional convention, Ottawa needed a "substantial [though not unanimous] mea-
sure of provincial consent .... " Id. at 905. See P. RussELL, R. DECARY, W. LEDERMAN, 
N. LYON, & D. SoeERMAN, THE CouRT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982) for a variety of 
perspectives on this judgment. 
44. See the essays on Federalism and Constitutional Change in Part II of AND No 
ONE CHEERED, supra note 2, for explanations of these positions, and R. SHEPPARD & M. 
VALPY, supra note 2, for an examination of the personalities involved. 
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necessary in order to appreciate the solution that was eventually 
fashioned. 411 
The first of these concerns, usually labeled "parliamentary 
sovereignty" in Canada, is that judicial supremacy is inconsis-
tent with the ideal of democratic self-rule. The Canadian people 
select a party to form a government in parliament based on the 
policy views expressed in its platform and the personal capacity 
of the party's leadership to carry out this policy. If the electorate 
is dissatisfied with the government's performance at the end of 
its term, the voters can (and often do) dismiss the government 
from office and replace it with another. The ballot box is the 
people's ultimate mechanism for controlling the shape of govern-
ment policies on taxation, spending, defense, and foreign affairs. 
In Canada, voting is also how citizens have traditionally influ-
enced "rights" issues such as abortion, capital punishment, and 
language. 
By contrast, Canadians do not select judges by election. Cana-
dian judges are appointed to tenured positions from which they 
can be removed only for personal misbehavior, a category which 
does not include the direction of their judicial rulings. This inde-
pendence, this absence of accountability to the general public, is 
at the very heart of the judicial office. Such detachment from 
popular passions is evidently desirable in a judge adjudicating 
the fate of an individual under an established legal frame-
work-e.g., "Is a defendant actually guilty of murder?" or "Did 
a doctor actually perform an illegal abortion?" It is less obvious 
that the same institutional distance from the populace is appro-
priate for someone whose task is to decide what the law will 
be-e.g., "Does Canada's current abortion law deny either the 
woman or the fetus the right not to be deprived of 'life, liberty 
or security ... except in accordance with fundamental princi-
ples of justice'?" or "Would restoration of the death penalty be 
'cruel and unusual punishment'?" 
This populist challenge to the Charter was the most intui-
tively obvious and widely voiced. This was also the easiest to 
meet, since ultimately it misses the point about fundamental 
rights. But a satisfactory response will proceed along three dif-
ferent fronts, because the strength of this objection varies mark-
edly with each. 
45. In this next Part of the article, I draw on a line of analysis which I earlier devel-
oped in Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decisionmaking, 46 CAN. BAR REV. 406 (1968); 
Weiler, The Defender of Civil Liberties, Ch. 7 of P. WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT (1974); 
and Weiler, Of Judges and Rights, Or Should Canada Have a Constitutional Bill of 
Rights?, 1980 DALHOUSIE REV. 205. 
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First, an inescapable fact of democratic self-rule in a vast and 
complex society is that there are inherent limits to the people's 
ability to participate directly. They cannot decide by majority 
rule at town meetings what every detail of their legal policy is to 
be. Government in modern societies involves an intricate divi-
sion of labor among many individuals and institutions, in view of 
the inherent limits of interest, expertise, and time available to 
the citizenry at large to air the issues.46 Although the positions 
at the apex of this government structure are filled by elected 
representatives of the people-in Canada, a Prime Minister, 
Cabinet, and governing party caucus-the vast majority of gov-
ernment slots are filled by professional appointees. The actions 
taken by these officials under the power of their office generate 
the greatest share of claims subject to judicial scrutiny under a 
constitutional Charter. 
An apt illustration is to be found in the administration of 
criminal justice. The fundamental challenge of the system is to 
find the optimum balance between the need for effective crime 
control and the claim to personal liberty. Obviously Parliament 
cannot pass general laws which resolve this tension in particular 
situations. All the legislature can do is express a mood; for ex-
ample, it could declare that powers of arrest must be exercised 
only on reasonable grounds, taking account of the relevant cir-
cumstances. Without a Charter, full authority to make the key 
administrative decisions in each specific instance would rest 
with officials-police, prosecutors, prison and parole board of-
ficers-who operate with little public visibility and who have a 
bureaucratic perspective inherently tilted against claims of civil 
liberty infringement. Under the Charter, final decisions about 
such claims would be made by judges with no institutional com-
mitment to either side and with the benefit of a public hearing 
in which each side can present its position. Whatever else one 
might say about the appropriate division of responsibility in this 
area, giving the authoritative voice to appointed judges instead 
of, say, to appointed prosecutors should not raise the spectre of 
erosion of Canadian democracy. 
Of course, this argument will not suffice where the legislature 
has made a clear statement about some important policy issue, 
in the criminal justice field or elsewhere. Here, a judicial "last 
word" under a constitution would put the judiciary at odds with 
the body that is directly accountable to the people. Even then, 
one must not leap too quickly to the conclusion that a judicial 
46. See generally R. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? (1970). 
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final say is always incompatible with democratic values. After 
all, a majority vote in a legislative assembly is not an infallible 
litmus test for "democracy": it is a procedural device that we 
find is normally the best instrument for securing the ideal of 
self-government in a community of political equals. But the 
practice of representative democracy implies a structural core 
consisting of periodic elections between parties competing for 
the vote of a broad-based electorate that has been educated 
about the issues through vigorous public commentary, especially 
by an uninhibited press. A government in power may be 
tempted to pass laws which hamstring the opposition party in an 
election, or dilute the integrity of the ballot through malappor-
tionment and gerrymander of constituencies, or muzzle the press 
to still criticism of its policies. Judicial power to strike down 
measures such as these, to require even elected legislators to ad-
here to the basic principles of a democratic regime, would seem 
to enhance rather than detract from the people's self-rule.47 
Had the domain of the new Charter been confined to this core 
of so-called "democratic rights," there would have been little op-
position to it in Canada. Popular recognition of the primacy of 
these rights is reflected, in fact, in the favored legal status that 
they were granted in the final version of the Charter.48 The great 
majority of rights guaranteed by the Charter, those labeled in 
the document as fundamental, egalitarian, legal, or language 
rights, cannot, however, be characterized as simply guaranteeing 
the integrity of democratic procedures. Canadians were well 
aware that most of the controversial rights jurisprudence in the 
United States-recent decisions about pornography, school 
prayer, busing, the death penalty, and abortion and earlier deci-
sions about labor and social legislation-arose from constitu-
tional provisions dealing with substantive rights rather than 
democratic procedures. Thus it was to this American experience 
that opponents of the Charter appealed in claiming that the 
principles of democracy were at odds with a constitutional docu-
ment that permitted the value judgments of an oligarchic court 
to prevail over an elected legislature responsible to the strong 
views of the majority. 
Even that objection holds only if one supposes democratic 
government to mean that whatever policy the majority of the 
community wants, it is entitled to have, irrespective of the bur-
47. This is the thesis of J. ELY, supra note 1, especially Ch. 5, Clearing the Channels 
of Political Change. 
48. See infra text accompanying note 99. 
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den this imposes on a dissenting minority. For my own part, I 
have always thought that democracy is an ideal, a regime deserv-
ing of support if, and only if, it incorporates some restraints on 
the legitimate scope of majority will, limitations on government 
power that flow from a decent respect for the fundamental 
rights of the individual. To put it another way, if one wants to 
justify, rather than simply describe, the democratic as con-
trasted to the authoritarian form of government, one has to ap-
peal to a notion of the equal worth of each individual, which 
implies an equal right to political participation. But that same 
premise will also imply a right to governmental respect for that 
individual's freedom of conscience, to protection against cruel 
and degrading punishment, and so on. Thus, when one unravels 
the case for democratic government, it supports not the pure 
majoritarian form, but rather a regime limited by a number of 
constituent moral principles. 
This being the case, it is not implausible to spell out these 
limits in a document designed to be enforced by the courts. It is 
true that the experience of Canada (and also of the United 
Kindgom) under a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty testi-
fies to the possibility of relying on the unwritten self-restraint of 
the political branch of the government to preserve individual 
rights.49 Canadian history, however, is also marred by unfortu-
nate illustrations of the tendency of overzealous legislatures, 
spurred on by popular passions, to flout unwritten principles of 
fairness-especially when they are advanced on behalf of an un-
popular minority.50 It may be asking too much of human nature 
to expect the political branch always to police itself and its ma-
jority supporters against this temptation. An independent judi-
ciary is the natural candidate to play that role. 
Let me add this comparative note. Judicial review seems to fit 
more comfortably within a congressional system of government, 
designed to distribute power among separate, independent 
branches. I suspect that it may be even more necessary in mod-
ern parliamentary government, with its concentration of power 
in a single office. 51 
The Canadian parliamentary system exhibits these two impor-
tant features: first, strict party discipline in the House of Com-
mons to avoid nonconfidence votes which would dislodge the 
49. Recall the death penalty issue discussed supra note 6. 
50. See T. BERGER, supra note 11. 
51. For a similar view, see E. FRIEDENBERG, supra note 4, especially Ch. 4, Some 
Structural Obstacles to Liberty under the Canadian System of Government (an expatri-
ate American critically examining the pre-Charter state of civil liberties in Canada). 
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government and precipitate an election, and, second, the growth 
of prime ministerial authority over his cabinet and his caucus, 
which has gradually eroded independent centers of power inside 
Ottawa. ~2 That fusion of governmental power is supposed to give 
the leader and his cabinet the political resources to achieve seri-
ous policy innovation, to pursue a sustained and coherent pro-
gram, and to answer to the electorate for the results. Many ob-
servers in the United States look fondly at that form of 
government, especially in comparison with the political entre-
preneurship which is endemic to the American congressional 
system, with its numerous wielders of power, each of whom is a 
target for special interest lobbies and all of whom are engaged in 
continual dealing and logrolling. 
But while parliamentary government may look like a more re-
sponsible, even a more democratic, instrument when its re-
sources are used for benign purposes, it can be a lot less attrac-
tive in actual operation. A governing party with a bare majority 
in a Canadian legislature can use party discipline and closure to 
impose its favored policies, even though our electoral system 
regularly produces governments that are formed exclusively by a 
party that has polled considerably less than the majority of 
votes. As the Parti Quebecois demonstrated, with the leverage of 
parlimentary power even such a "plurality" government can 
swiftly initiate a fundamental transformation in society through 
an instrument such as the Charter of the French Language, 
which was enacted almost untouched, in spite of the intense op-
position of a sizeable English-speaking minority in Quebec.~3 
In the United States, on the other hand, the congressional 
model has historically been celebrated as a barrier to this kind 
of majority tyranny. There are many independent centers of 
power in Washington able to deflect the current will of the ma-
jority by voicing the intense interest of minority groups who 
would be adversely affected. Thus any policy that succeeds in 
navigating its way past all these shoals is highly likely to enjoy 
widespread support. ~4 Judicial review in the United States is 
simply another factor in that elaborate system of checks and 
balances; in the recent activist era of judicial review, it has acted 
as a lever, giving protection to certain minorities who have not 
fared so well with the elected branches of American government. 
52. See the essays in APEX OF POWER (T. Hockin ed. 1977). See also R. PUNNE'IT, THE 
PRIME MINISTER IN CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1977). 
53. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25. 
54. See J. CuoPER, supra note 1, at 4-47. 
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Few such institutional obstacles and protections are available in 
Canada. That is why I believe, contrary to the conventional wis-
dom, that the case for external judicial review of the political 
process is stronger m the context of a parliamentary 
government.1111 
B. The Wisdom of Judge-made Rights 
To argue that judicial authority over fundamental rights is le-
gitimate, as I have done here, is not to establish that it is desira-
ble. To illustrate the difference, consider the question whether 
to entrench in the constitution the right to economic justice-to 
a reasonable minimum income or perhaps even to a fair distribu-
tion of wealth. It would not be difficult to make a stronger case 
for such a right than for many rights currently guaranteed under 
American constitutional law, for example, the emerging right of 
"intimate association."116 Indeed, more equitable distribution of 
economic resources and assurance of a minimum standard of liv-
ing is arguably as essential to realization of democratic self-rule 
as is much of what is categorized as "freedom of speech. "57 Yet 
no mention of these economic rights appears in the Charter,118 
notwithstanding the fact that during his incarnation as a consti-
tutional law professor, Trudeau promoted the case for recogniz-
ing these rights. 119 .,. 
The reason for the omission was simply that, however attrac-
55. Of course, this comparative judgment about the repressive potential of the con-
gressional and parliamentary models of governments holds only ceteris paribus. A par-
ticular country may be lucky enough in its social equilibrium that it can be more protec-
tive of fundamental rights even with a parliamentary system. See the discussion about 
the death penalty in Canada, supra note 6. 
56. See generally Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 
(1980). 
57. See R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982); C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS 
AND MARKETS (1977); see also Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and Its Fu-
ture, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 249-257 (1981). 
58. Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, actually does write in one aspect of 
economic justice, the principle of equalization of the revenues available to different pro-
vincial governments for the provision of public services. The inclusion of this principle in 
the Charter represents one of the proud achievements of postwar Canadian federalism. 
See Davenport, The Constitution and the Sharing of Wealth in Canada, LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982, at 109 (1982). Nevertheless, the constitutional drafters were 
careful not to entrench any formula that would create a legal entitlement in this area. 
The difficulties that Canadian governments had experienced in the 1970's in implement-
ing the principle of intergovernmental equality convinced them that the authority to 
adjust the equalization scheme to a changing economic universe had to be left with the 
political rather than judicial branches of government. 
59. See Trudeau, Economic Rights, 8 McGILL L.J. 121 (1961). 
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tive the concept of economic equality might seem in the ab-
stract, to translate that right into more specific terms and then 
to enforce it in the real world, where it would inevitably conflict 
with other rights and freedoms, would be a difficult and conten-
tious undertaking. Certainly that task would require not mere 
technical legal expertise, but broad philosophical vision and fine 
social sensitivity. Yet essentially the same judgment would be 
true for most of the rights included in the proposed Charter. 
Thus, the real dilemma facing Canadians was not whether our 
parliamentary democracy should honor basic human rights, but 
whether wiser judgments about the meaning of our political mo-
rality would emerge if final say on the subject were given to the 
courts. 
Here, the American experience was most enlightening. The 
literature on judicial review is strongly in accord that American 
courts, under the rubric of constitutional law, are articulating 
the fundamental moral principles of the society; as one scholar 
observed, the judge "searches for what is true, right or just."60 A 
few commentators lament this departure from fidelity to the in-
tention of the original constitution's writers;61 others attempt to 
confine the judicial quest to "participational" values, to enhanc-
ing the quality of representative democracy.62 But most modern 
constitutional scholars applaud this judicial role, precisely be-
cause they believe courts are more competent at this task than 
are legislatures. 63 
Courts do have certain institutional advantages that make this 
claim plausible. Whereas legislators tend to fob off troublesome 
moral issues, feeling that they can only lose votes by taking a 
stand on them, judges are obliged to respond to each claim on 
its legal merits, no matter how unpopular its exponent may be.64 
Nor is it enough for the judges just to assert a bare preference 
for a particular result: the court must also provide a reasoned 
justification for its decision, extending to the instant case the 
benefit of principles that underlie analogous cases.65 Because 
they are not compelled by electoral self-preservation simply to 
reflect existing community moral values and prejudices, judges 
60. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979). 
61. Especially Raoul Berger. See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 363-72. 
62. This is the thesis of J. ELY, supra note 1. 
63. Two of the best recent statements of this viewpoint are Dworkin, supra note 29, 
and Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1979). 
64. See Fiss, supra note 60, at 12-14. 
65. See C. BLACK, supra note 1. 
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are free to move the law forward to a more enlightened view-
point on a controversial subject. They can stake out a position 
that the people may well accept once they see it spelled out, but 
that an electorally accountable body would have been loathe to 
risk proposing in the face of current attitudes.66 As Ronald 
Dworkin once put it, judicial review transfers fundamental right 
issues "from the battleground of power politics to the forum of 
[moral and legal] principle."67 
The contrast between the way that Canadian law and Ameri-
can law treat illegally obtained evidence vividly illustrates the 
force of that claim. Two decades ago the United States Supreme 
Court fashioned the doctrine that evidence obtained as a result 
of unconstitutional police investigation is inadmissible in a crim-
inal prosecution.68 The Canadian Supreme Court refused to 
adopt the same doctrine under our statutory Bill of Rights.69 
Even in the United States there is a vigorous debate about this 
evidentiary rule70 that focuses on whether the rule effectively de-
ters illegal police action out in the field-the primary justifica-
tion for the doctrine in the eyes of several Supreme Court 
justices. 
However that argument turns out, from the Canadian per-
spective, a major virtue of the American rule is the light that it 
has thrown on the entire array of police and prosecutorial prac-
tices. Abuse of power in this area is no longer swept under the 
political rug. With a rule excluding illegally obtained evidence, 
United States courts provide both an incentive and a forum for 
the legal profession to examine such issues as "stop and frisk" or 
border searches, to weigh the merits of arguments for crime con-
trol and due process, and then to develop a principled solution 
for each situation. No such dialogue has taken place in Canada, 
not even under the old Bill of Rights, through which the Cana-
dian Supreme Court, in effect, passed the buck back to Parlia-
ment, a body institutionally incapable of fashioning a satisfac-
66. See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 111-113. 
67. Dworkin, supra note 29, at 518. 
68. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960). 
69. See Hogan v. The Queen, 48 D.L.R.3d 427 (Can. 1975). 
70. See the debate between Y. Kamisar and M. Wilkey in Kamisar, Is the Exclusion-
ary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 62 Ju-
DICATURE 67 (1978); Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The 
Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment More Than 'An Empty Blessing', 62 JUDICA-
TURE 337 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 
JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wilkey, A Call for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule: Let 
Congress and the Trial Courts Speak, 62 JUDICATURE 351 (1979). See also Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on The Fourth Amendme,;t, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 429-39 (1974); Oaks, 
Studying the Exlusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665 (1970). 
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tory jurisprudence for these ticklish but low-visibility issues. 
Now that the Charter provides such an exclusionary rule,71 a 
systematic and authoritative appraisal of the Canadian criminal 
justice system is getting underway. 
While the advantages of the judicial forum supported a major 
role for Canadian courts on rights issues, they did not necessar-
ily dictate that our judges have the last word, as contemplated 
by the original Charter Resolution. Whatever the fancy claims 
legal scholars make for judicial reflection about issues of high 
moral principle, many Canadians had serious qualms about as-
signing final authority on such issues to a forum reserved exclu-
sively for lawyers. 
One concern was with the fact-finding technique employed by 
lawyers, the presentation of oral testimony under oath, subject 
to cross-examination by opposing counsel. While this technique 
constitutes a powerful instrument for getting at the adjudicative 
facts to which a legal rule will be applied-who did what to 
whom ?-it is less than ideal for developing policy facts, those 
patterns and ambiguities in social life relevant to judgments 
about what the legal rules should be. 72 Does the death penalty 
actually reduce the homicide rate to the extent that it should 
not be labeled wantonly cruel punishment?73 Does mandatory 
busing to integrate schools improve the educational achievement 
of black children enough to declare it constitutionally required 
for equal educational opportunity?74 My own experience has 
convinced me that the legislative or administrative process, cer-
tainly by comparison with the current Canadian judicial process, 
offers the best access to the ingredients of sophisticated policy 
analysis. 75 And for the many issues on which the social sciences 
off er little help, legislators can rely on a broader range of per-
71. The original version of the Charter precluded such a remedy. In line with the 
general trend in the Joint Parliamentary Committee to expand the force of the Charter, 
see supra note 7, however, a new§ 24 provided a broad remedial authority for the courts 
that included the power to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence. See P. HOGG, 
supra note 2, at 66-68. Still such exclusion is not automatic: it should occur only when 
introduction of the evidence would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute." 
Constitution Act, 1982, § 24(2). This limitation added another sensitive moral judgment 
to the responsibilities of Canadian courts under the Charter. 
72. The best treatment of this issue is D. HOROWITZ, THE CouRTS AND Soc1AL Poucv 
(1977). A provocative treatment in the same vein, but in the context of judicial control of 
administrative agencies, is J. MASHAW, BuREACRATIC JUSTICE (1983). 
73. J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 178-194 (2nd ed. 1983). 
74. Rossell, Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effec-
tiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 69 (1983). 
75. See Russell, The Effect of a Charter of Rights on The Policy-Making Role of 
Canadian Courts, 25 CAN. Pue. Ao. 1 (1982). 
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sonal experience and contact with the general public in making 
commonsense decisions. 
I do not mean to overstate the advantages of the political 
branch. Only too often elected officials find it safer to ignore 
what they learn and simply to vote according to the prejudices 
of their constituents. But I do want to underline the occupa-
tional vice of courts: in the rarefied atmosphere of their cham-
bers, judges may occasionally spin out the logical implications of 
an abstract principle without appreciating how awkwardly the 
doctrine fits with real world concerns.76 Even worse, the defec-
tive products of that process become embedded in constitutional 
jurisprudence, immune from the normal process of policy experi-
mentation and change. 
This shortcoming is characteristic of the performance of the 
Canadian judiciary in its traditional constitutional role as um-
pire of Canadian federalism. 77 Canadian courts gave much the 
same treatment to our New Deal era legislation as did the 
United States Supreme Court, but Canadian judges never made 
the "switch in time that saved nine." Canadian law still contains 
much of what the courts called the "watertight compartment" 
theory of our federal system, which they fashioned early in the 
twentieth century. Only an ingenious system of intergovernmen-
tal negotiations enabled the Canadian political process to escape 
that constitutional straitjacket and to deal effectively with the 
problems of the postwar era. Yet in the 1970's, when such fed-
eral-provincial diplomacy proved less successful and the courts 
reemerged as major actors within Canadian federalism, the old 
doctrines were often woodenly applied with little regard for con-
temporary socioeconomic facts and needs. Without digressing to 
substantiate these assertions, I can say that the performance of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in the federalism arena did not, 
for many of our governmental leaders, inspire confidence in the 
Court's competence to fulfill its new role as the oracle of our 
fundamental rights. 
The beginning of wisdom in comparative constitutionalism 
76. Growing appreciation of this tendency was a major theme in the evolving position 
of Alexander Bickel, from his A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) to A. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1969) and finally to A. BICKEL, 
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975). 
77. I have written in detail about this in Weiler, The Supreme Court and The Law of 
Canadian Federalism, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 307 (1973) and have speculated about the 
Court's role in The Umpire of Canadian Federalism, ch. 6 of my book IN THE LAST 
RESORT (1974). At the moment, I am writing a book titled THE LASKIN COURT AND CANA-
DIAN FEDERALISM: 1974-84. I draw on all these sources for the observations made in this 
paragraph. 
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consists in the realization that the appropriate division of labor 
between legislature and judiciary must, to a large extent, be in-
digenous to each country and must depend on that nation's ex-
perience with and faith in the operation of each branch. Ameri-
cans have more confidence in the wisdom of their judges, and 
less in their state legislatures, than do Canadians. Over the last 
quarter century the American judiciary has grown increasingly 
sophisticated in its approach to legal issues, a development nec-
essary in view of the greater responsibilities that have been en-
trusted to it. But even in the United States I sense that courts 
tend to the characteristic weakness I noted earlier. As illustra-
tion, let me contrast the treatment of two election rights issues 
to show how differently the political process in Canada has re-
sponded to problems for which, in the United States, the Su-
preme Court has provided a constitutional formula. 
In Canada, although we encourage free and vigorous 
campaigning by candidates and parties, we have placed strict 
limits on the amount of money that may be spent on a cam-
paign, specifically, on the amount of television time that may be 
purchased.78 We do not accept the legal logic of the United 
States Supreme Court that the freedom to speak one's mind on 
political issues without government censorship implies the free-
dom to spend as much money as one wants in propagating these 
views. 79 Similarly, Canadians believe that each person should 
have only one vote; and we periodically realign electoral bounda-
ries to preserve a reasonable range in constituency size.80 Yet we 
do not believe that political equality mandates anything near 
mathematical identity among election districts so as to ignore 
geographic dispersion within the ridings, natural alignments 
among voters and legislators concentrated in large urban areas, 
and so on.81 Political scientists tell us that it is impossible to 
78. There is a comprehensive analysis of the nature and operation of the Canadian 
system of campaign financing in F. SEIDLE & K. PALTIEL, Party Finance, The Election 
Expenses Act, and Campaign Spending in 1979 and 1980, in CANADA AT THE POLLS, 
1979 AND 1980, at 226 (H. Penninan ed. 1981). 
79. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). For the effects of Buckley, see Cox, 
Constitutional Issues: The Regulation of the Financing of Election Campaigns, 31 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (1982); Drew, Politics and Money: Part I, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 
1982, at 54; Drew, Politics and Money: Part II, NEW YORKER, Dec. 13, 1982, at 57. 
80. See Beaudoin, The Democratic Rights, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND 
FREEDOMS, supra note 37, at 213, 229-230. 
81. The United States Supreme Court has adopted this interpretation of its Consti-
tution, at least for congressional districts. See Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983); 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). For 
a sustained critique of the intellectual underpinning of this conclusion, see W. ELLIOTT, 
THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974). For an earlier discussion of the contrary Ca-
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achieve the ideal of an equal value for each person's vote in a 
system of single-member constituencies with elections conducted 
on a first-past-the-post model.82 Without expounding here on 
why I prefer the Canadian approach to these issues, these and 
other examples83 satisfy me that the pragmatic balance that is 
likely to emerge from the political process is often as sensitive to 
the values underlying fundamental rights as is the rigorous elab-
oration of constitutional principles by a court. 
But this is not to recant on the positive case made above for 
constitutional rights. The availability of a judicial forum in the 
United States allows issues of moral and political princi-
ple-affirmative action, for example-to be aired, producing a 
sophisticated national dialogue about them. Perhaps such an 
uninhibited debate is not always an unmixed blessing. The con-
troversy over abortion, for instance, was much more muted in 
Canada than in the United States. One reason this was so is that 
in the late 1960's the Canadian Parliament expanded the 
grounds for legal abortion to include instances where the health 
of the mother was in danger. Administration of the law was dele-
gated to hospital committees composed of doctors. In most parts 
of Canada, doctors have brought about de facto abortion on de-
mand by expanding the concept of "health," though that evolu-
tion has taken place sub rosa and, thus, in a rather erratic and 
nadian position, see Caron, Un Homme, Un Vote, 2 THEMIS 209 (1967). 
82. Although pure proportional representation might be taken to embody the ideal of 
an equal value for each person's vote, it poses serious dangers to the stability and per-
formance of the political regime itself. For an extended treatment of the issue of partial 
proportional representation which has emerged as the constitutional concern with the 
electoral system in Canada, see W. IRVINE, DOES CANADA NEED A NEW ELECTORAL Svs-
TEM? (1979). 
83. For instance, the claim of French-Catholics to publicly supported "separate but 
equal" schools for their children, which I treated earlier under its language aspect, see 
supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text, is part of a broader Canadian program of full 
public funding of denominational schools (with separate school boards and tax rates). 
Those interested in a comparative treatment of this first amendment issue could journey 
just north of the border and find a country that not only has none of the "entanglement" 
of church and state, which has so exercised the United States Supreme Court, but also 
has a flourishing public school system as well. See Hudon, Church, State, and Education 
in Canada and the United States: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law, 21 LES 
CAHIERS DE DROIT 461 (1980). . 
It would also be interesting to compare the operation of the American solution to the 
problem of freedom of the press and libel of public figures, a narrow malice-based liabil-
ity rule with potential million dollar awards, contingency fees for plaintiff's counsel, and 
no costs for successful defendants, with the Canadian solution, a broad common law doc-
trine of strict liability with lower awards (five figures or less), rare contingent fees, and 
costs assessed against the losing plaintiff. For a somewhat dated look at the two systems, 
see Weiler, Defamation, Enterprise Liability and Freedom of Speech, 17 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 278 (1967). 
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inequitable fashion. 84 But at the same time, because abortions 
are all performed for reasons of "health" in order to be legal, 
they are automatically paid for by the national health insurance 
scheme. Now this rather ramshackle product of the process of 
"muddling through" in the political arena is about to be tested 
in the forum of high legal principle by constitutioµal challenges 
to the current regime from both the pro-choice and the pro-life 
ends of the spectrum. Perhaps in a few years Canadians will look 
back fondly upon our age of innocence in the pre-Charter days! 811 
I doubt that this will be the case. Canadian democracy will 
benefit from the constitutional stimulus provided by the Charter 
to sustained reflection about moral restraints upon majority 
rule. Putting fundamental rights in the constitution was a neces-
sary, though not sufficient, means to that end. At the same time, 
there was reason to be uneasy about taking the fateful step that 
would give Canadian judges and lawyers-not to mention law 
professors-the nearly exclusive voice in that dialogue. For those 
who recognized that there were two sides to the problem, the 
proposed Charter posed a genuine dilemma. Could we devise a 
satisfactory solution to the problem of judges and rights in our 
democracy? From here, my account will unavoidably become 
more personal. 
IV. SOLVING THE DILEMMA 
A. Creating a New Kind of Court 
One possibly fruitful avenue might have been to approach the 
dilemma from the "judge" side of the ledger. After all, the pow-
erful new role that Canadian courts were being given in our pub-
lic life should certainly have merited thorough scrutiny of the 
nature and operation of the judicial process to ensure that it 
would be up to the challenge. In fact, considerable attention was 
paid to the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the constitu-
84. For criticism of the nature and administration of current abortion Jaw of Canada, 
see REPORT OF THE BADGLEY COMMITTEE ON THE ABORTION LAW (1977); Dickens, The 
Morgentaler Case: Criminal Process and Abortion Law, 14 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 229 
(1975); Harris & Tupper, A Study of Therapeutic Abortion Committees in British Co-
lumbia, 11 U. BRIT. CoLUM. L. REv. 81 (1977). 
85. The heated post-Charter debate about abortion in Canada is evidenced by the 
fact that the litigation has produced two cover story reports. See Riley, The Agony Over 
Abortion, MACLEAN'S, July 25, 1983, at 32; Special Report: Abortion, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 
19, 1984, at 44. 
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tional debates of the 1970's.88 A valuable by-product of this de-
bate was that the notion of a specialized constitutional tribunal, 
on the European model, was placed on the Canadian agenda. 
This notion impliedly rejected the nineteenth-century view that 
the constitution is merely an ordinary law, to be construed and 
applied by the ordinary courts of the land.87 
If one were to begin designing a new tribunal whose exclusive 
responsibility would be interpreting the constitution, novel and 
intriguing possibilities might emerge about the mode and terms 
of appointment of its members and about the manner in which 
the body would proceed to hear and resolve issues.88 More perti-
nent to my inquiry here, one might well want to appoint some 
nonlawyers to this "court," thus insuring that the body with ul-
timate authority over fundamental questions of political moral-
ity would include members with the perspective of other disci-
plines and the experience of other vocations. 
In the United States, contemporary commentary on modern 
constitutional jurisprudence starts from the premises that the 
Supreme Court's role is to expound the nation's fundamental 
values, 89 that the Court is engaged in a "search for what is true, 
right, or just,"0O and even that it is a font of "moral prophecy."01 
How, then, could anyone seriously argue that this function must 
be performed exclusively by lawyers?02 Surely one would want to 
86. The debate, however, focused on the Court's existing constitutional role as um-
pire of Canadian federalism. The best review of the numerous proposals and arguments 
in that debate is MacPherson, The Potential Implications of Constitutional Reform for 
the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1 CANADA AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION 225 (S. Beck & 
I. Bernier ed. 1983). 
87. See generally M. CAPPELLE'ITI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
(1971). Of course, in the United States that simplistic view has long been rejected. Re-
cently, there have been a number of proposals to pare away much of the general appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in order to permit the Court to focus its energies 
on its burdensome constitutional workload. See Note, Of High Designs: A Compendium 
of Proposals to Reduce the Work Load of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307 
(1983). 
88. An especially illuminating study of the range of options which have proved viable 
in different countries is M. SHAPIRO, COURTS (1981). 
89. See supra note 63; see also C. BLACK, supra note l; Richards, Moral Philosophy 
and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutional Law, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319 
(1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 
YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 
(1982). 
90. Fiss, supra note 60. 
91. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 98. 
92. Though, for the reasons stated earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 60-71, I 
think one would want a tribunal with the characteristics of a "court": independence, 
openness, obligation to come to grips with the issue on its merits, and a commitment to 
the method of principled reasoning. 
FALL 1984) Canadian Rights and Judges 79 
include voices from other quarters in this "interpretive commu-
nity."93 For example, rather than rely on William Brennan's ver-
sion of the egalitarian liberalism of John Rawls, why not include 
Rawls himself?0" Appointing a sophisticated journalist such as 
George Will along with a William Rehnquist would certainly add 
breadth and depth to a constitutional tribunal; so would includ-
ing a social scientist such as Kenneth Clark along with a 
Thurgood Marshall. 
Attractive as this idea may be, when I suggested it several 
ye.ars ago in a public lecture in Vancouver,95 it proved to be a 
definite nonstarter in Canada. The Canadian public clings to the 
illusion that constitutional adjudication is entirely a legal skill, 
and our lawyers-including our lawyer-politicians-are more 
than happy to foster that view and thereby protect their turf. 
B. Creating a New Kind of Right 
If we cannot change the nature of the court so as to broaden 
the dialogue about fundamental rights, why not change the na-
ture of the rights themselves, so as to foster a more fruitful ex-
change between courts and legislatures? The first step in doing 
so is to enshrine fundamental rights in the constitution rather 
than leave them as part of ordinary statutory or common law. 
This will give these rights a legal imprimatur as a signal to our 
judges that they are to be taken seriously (as they were not 
under the old Canadian Bill of Rights). At the same time, 
though, an escape valve permitting the elected legislature to en-
act a statute that will prevail notwithstanding the Charter of 
Rights-a statute that explicitly states that it was enacted on 
such terms-should be incorporated into the Charter itself, 
modifying the legal force of the rights therein contained. 
I launched this notion in another public lecture, this time in 
93. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982). 
94. Ronald Dworkin made one of the more provocative observations in the debate 
about constitutional adjudication of the 1970's when he maintained that the constitu-
tional lawyer of the future would have to be well-versed in first-rate moral philosophy, as 
exemplified by J. Rawls' A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 149. 
This brings to mind the famous fantasy of Learned Hand: "Hand was in heaven and in 
the company of a group of intellectual heavyweights who were talking with God about 
large political-moral issues. And the Lord said: 'Shut up, Plato! I want to hear what 
Hand has to say!'" Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REv. 326, 334 n.10 (1983). 
95. This was the Ladner Lecture at the University of British Columbia. See P. WEI-
LER, WHAT THE SUPREME COURT IS DOING TO THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT CONSTITU-
TIONAL REFORM MAY Do TO THE COURT (1980). 
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Halifax, at the other end of the country.96 Initially it attracted 
as little attention and support as my proposal for nonlawyer 
judges. But two years later, when the idea was presented to 
some participants in the provincial-federal negotiations on the 
eve of the final conference in November 1981, it appeared to be 
a tolerable compromise to the deadlock over the Charter. The 
legislative override-or non obstante formula, as it is dubbed in 
legal parlance-found its way into the constitution as the dis-
tinctive Canadian solution to the problem of judges and rights_in 
a democracy. 97 
As I noted at the outset, most Canadians, then and now, see 
non obstante as the product of political expediency-a necessary 
evil, perhaps, but not a formula to be proud of. Obviously, I take 
quite a different view: for Canada at least, this was an intrinsi-
cally sound solution to the dilemma of rights and courts. Now 
that I have made full disclosure of my personal involvement and 
inclination, I shall spell out the arguments for and against the 
non obstante formula.98 
96. This was the Killam Lecture at the University of Dalhousie. See Weiler, Of 
Judges and Rights, Or Should Canada Have a Constitutional Bill of Rights?, 1980 DAL-
HOUSIE REV. 205. 
97. I do not mean to imply that the non obstante idea was brand-new. Actually, it 
had been around in Canadian law for about two decades as a feature of the old Bill of 
Rights (§ 2). But this clause was inserted in the statutory Bill as a limitation on Parlia-
ment in the "manner and form" through which it could override these protected rights in 
the face of the long-standing maxim that Parliament could not legally limit its future 
action. See W. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 3, at 87-116. By the 1970's, the debate had 
moved on to the question of whether Canadian legislatures should be restrained by an 
explicitly constitutional document, and both sides tacitly assumed that the only choice 
was between full entrenchment or none. In 1979, when I ventured to ask whether Canada 
should have a constitutional Bill of Rights, see supra note 96, it seemed to me that this 
was a false dichotomy: instead there was a broader menu of options from which we could 
choose. I proposed that Canadians employ the non obstante device as an outlet for Par-
liamentary action under an otherwise constitutionally entrenched Charter. See infra note 
99 (describing a procedural wrinkle I added to the non obstante device). So far as I 
know, this was the only written brief for such a solution to our constitutional deadlock. 
For a time this argument remained in academic obscurity. On September 28, 1981, 
however, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision in Reference re Amend-
ment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1981), see supra note 43, a 
complex ruling which put considerable pressure on both sides to return to the bargaining 
table for •me final attempt at settlement. That set a number of governments looking for 
alternatives to those already on the table. In the next several weeks I spoke personally to 
senior public officials in British Columbia and Ottawa and just before the Conference to 
Premier Davis of Ontario. (Sometime earlier I had discussed the paper at length with 
Premier Blakeney of Saskatchewan.) Equipped with this basic familiarity with the non 
obstante notion within Canadian law, and with one extended scholarly defense of its 
virtues in the constitutional context, the protagonists reached for this formula for their 
Accord in the early hours of the -morning of November 3, 1981. 
98. Though I would not rest my defense on this point, one can make a particularly 
strong case for the non obstante clause as a short-term, transitional feature of a Char-
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First, it appears evident that even with the non obstante pro-
visions, the new Charter will succeed in large part in securing 
the protection of fundamental rights that Canadians sought 
through constitutional entrenchment. The Charter contains a 
mandate to Canadian judges to restrain all infringements of 
these rights by executive officials and tribunals, whose intrusions 
are usually cloaked in broad legal language rather than specific 
legislative directives. 
Furthermore, elected legislatures are now precluded from 
passing laws that inadvertently or obliquely infringe on constitu-
tional values. Indeed, even if Parliament were deliberately and 
clearly to express its will to limit a fundamental right, it could 
not do so under the Charter simply by stating its intention to do 
so. To make such a law prevail, the government would have to 
use a formula designed to draw the proposal to the attention of 
the opposition, the press, and the general public. In a society 
sufficiently enamored of fundamental rights to enshrine them in 
ter. Introducing constitutional rights into Canada posed a serious problem precisely be-
cause we live right next door to the United States. Judicial review has been a feature of 
American law for nearly 200 years. The judicial process in the United States has grown 
highly sophisticated in handling these questions. American lawyers and judges have been 
able to learn by doing the skill of constitutional adjudication. Typically, the easier claims 
come first. The process of resolving them produces an intellectual apparatus which gen-
erates new and harder problems, but also provides directions on how to solve them. At 
any one time, then, there will be something of an equilibrium in the character of the 
questions posed and the capacity of the legal culture to grapple with them. 
That legal learning curve would not have been available in Canada. The proposed 
Charter contained essentially the same rights, and used much the same language, as the 
United States Constitution. There were few domestic precedents or analyses, however, 
that would be helpful in interpreting the new provisions. Commentaries and Annotations 
were quickly published which included references to the major American cases, often the 
most recent and controversial decisions. Thus, the accidents of litigation were just as 
likely to present to Canadian courts the hard cases first, because the Canadian lawyer 
would look for and be able to find an American precedent to use as a legal lever for his 
own case. 
In that setting, one concern was that Canadian courts might jump in and do the wrong 
thing because they have not had to traverse each step and test out the logic of the argu-
ments on each side of the question. The judges might apply aspects of American juris-
prudence inconsistent with the Canadian experience. The non obstante provision allows 
for legislative corrections of these judicial bloopers while the courts are feeling their way. 
The more likely prospect, though, is that the Canadian courts, not seeing a safe legal 
bridge to a solution to these hard cases, would simply refuse to leap into the problem 
area at all. The judges would give the provisions of the Charter the same kind of narrow, 
crabbed construction that the Supr~me Court had given to the old Bill of Rights. One 
must remember that although the authors of the Charter may have intended activist 
judicial review, their intent would neither guarantee nor even justify that the courts 
would comply. To my mind, a major virtue of the non obstante provision was that it 
could elicit more vigorous judicial scrutiny of a broad range of civil rights issues, because 
it would give our judges a sense of security from the presence of a legislative safety net 
beneath them. 
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its constitution, invocation of the non obstante phrase is guaran-
teed to produce a lot of political flak. A government would risk 
taking such a step only if it were certain. of widespread public 
backing for its position on the matter in question. Thus, in spite 
of this legal escape hatch, Canadian politicians and commenta-
tors concede almost unanimously that the rights contained in 
the Charter enjoy a greatly enhanced status by comparison with 
those that are not. 
Was it not dangerous, though, not to take the final legal step 
and fully guarantee these rights against an oppressive govern-
ment tempted on occasion to deny them? To some extent this 
was done. As insurance against the remote possibility of a gov-
ernment's attempting to perpetuate itself in power by denying 
basic rights of participation, the core of "democratic" 
rights-the rights to vote and run for an elected parliament 
which is required to meet at least once a year and to face the 
people for reelection at least every five years-were fully en-
trenched in the Constitution. But the "fundamental" right of 
free speech, the "legal" right to be free of arbitrary arrest, and 
the "egalitarian" right to protection against discrimination were 
each made subject to legislative restriction enacted in the proper 
manner. While Canadian judges had the initial authority to de-
termine whether a particular law was a "reasonable limit [ of a 
right] ... demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soci-
ety," Canadian legislators were given the final say if they dis-
agreed with the courts with enough conviction to take the politi-
cal risks of challenging the symbolic force of the popular 
Charter.99 
Some may balk at the prospect of entrusting the legislature 
with even such a carefully circumscribed authority. After all, the 
very reason for a constitutional Charter was our desire to protect 
the fundamental rights of an unpopular individual or a dissident 
minority against popular emotion and prejudice expressed 
through a legislature responsive to the majority. Only constitu-
99. In my original Article, I suggested an additional buffer. To trump a Supreme 
Court decision, a legislature would first have to enact the law with a non obstante clause. 
An election must then take place (though the election need not have been called on this 
issue), after which the legislature must reenact the law for it to become effective. 
This "sober second thought" procedure would give the people ample time and oppor-
tunity to decide whether they preferred the views of their judges or their legislators. In 
the actual Charter version, a different procedural device was used: a law enacted with a 
non obstante clause becomes valid at once, but to remain effective it has to be reenacted 
every five years with that same formula. This "sunset" procedure gives the people their 
say after the fact but requires the legislature, the electorate, and also, one hopes, the 
judges to think the problem through again and again. 
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tional entrenchment in the strong sense is up to that task. 
In one respect, this argument might take us too far. It would 
rule out even objectionable constitutional amendments pushed 
through by a dominant majority using this vehicle to trample on 
the rights of the individual.100 The immediate rejoinder, of 
course, is to require the concurrence of a supermajority for con-
stitutional revisions so that the people will rarely encroach on 
the judicial plan. 101 The problem with the argument in this form 
is that it assumes the point at issue: it implies that the legisla-
tive override rather than the judicial construction is likely to be 
wrong on the merits. In those cases where the judiciary has mis-
carried, to permit popular change only through formal amend-
ment means that a tiny minority102 could hold the nation in a 
constitutional vise from which, as the American people have 
found, it might take even a war to break loose. 
One cannot choose, then, between formal amendment and leg-
islative override as the preferred method for revising judge-made 
constitutional policy simply by a priori reasoning about rights 
and democracy. One must make a practical judgment about the 
relative competence of two imperfect institutions in the context 
100. Indeed, it has been seriously argued that the United States Supreme Court 
should ignore a formal amendment which it considered an invidious denial of the moral 
principles expressed in the rest of the Constitution. See Murphy, An Ordering of Consti-
tutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 754-57 (1980). But see Brest, Accommodation of 
Majoritarianism and Rights of Human Dignity, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 763-64 (1980). 
101. In the United States, both houses of Congress, the President, and three-fourths 
of the states must approve a constitutional amendment, and, in two centuries, only four 
decisions of the Supreme Court have been overridden in this way. Under the British 
North America Act, the concurrence of Ottawa and "substantially" all of the provinces 
was conventionally necessary to amend the federal division of authority (Canada's tradi-
tional preserve of constitutional review), see supra note 43, and only three reversals of 
the judicial construction of Canadian federalism were secured in the first century of its 
existence. Under the new Constitution Act, 1982, amendments will require the concur-
rence of Ottawa and any seven provinces that comprise at least 50% of the population. 
This means that either Ontario or Quebec must agree. See generally Dellinger, The 
Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective, LAW 
& CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1982, at 283. 
Steep political hurdles as well as technical difficulties face any formal amendment to a 
constitution. That procedure is best suited for major revision of general concepts or prin-
ciples. If there is popular objection to a specific application of an existing provision (e.g., 
due process), it is difficult to draft language which focuses only on this specific issue 
without attracting the opposition of those who worry about its implications elsewhere. In 
this respect, the legislative override is more of a surgical instrument than is formal 
amendment, and thus its use is much easier to entertain. Whether this is good or bad 
depends on one's view of the arguments discussed in the text. 
102. In the United States, 13 states with as few as nine million people, see C. BLACK, 
supra note 1, at 38, and in Canada, four provinces with just over two million people. See 
the population of the four smallest Canadian provinces in R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, 
supra note 15, at 352. 
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of a particular nation. The premise of the Charter is that the 
optimal arrangement for Canada is a new partnership between 
court and legislature. Under this approach judges will be on the 
front lines; they will possess both the responsibility and the legal 
clout necessary to tackle "rights" issues as they regularly arise. 
At the same time, however, the Charter reserves for the legisla-
ture a final say to be used sparingly in the exceptional case 
where the judiciary has gone awry. This institutional division of 
labor rests on the assumption that the chief threat to rights in 
Canada comes from legislative thoughtlessness about particular 
intrusions, a fault that can be cured by thoroughly airing the 
issues of principle in a judicial forum. The Charter contemplates 
no serious danger of outright legislative oppression; certainly 
none sufficient to concede ultimate authority to Canadian judges 
and lawyers. 
I suspect that this arrangement would not be unthinkable in 
the United States (even to people who would vigorously oppose 
the use of this power in particular cases, like the proposed 
human life bill) if it were translated into a congressional over-
ride of the Supreme Court. 103 Any measure that could be navi-
gated through all the branches of the national legislative pro-
cess, each reflecting a variety of constituencies and points of 
view, might well be considered a more sensible approach to the 
problem than would a verdict from a bare majority of five on the 
Court. 104 But almost all American scholars would have grave 
103. See Levinson, The Turn Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 567, 575-78 (1983); Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 
MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1185-89 (1977). In fact, Felix Frankfurter favored this option as a 
means to deal with the constitutional crisis of the New Deal. See P. IRONS, THE NEW 
DEAL LAWYERS 274-75 (1982). 
104. Indeed, there is reason to believe that Congress's existing authority to carve out 
exceptions to the jurisdiction of the federal courts implies an analogous power. Some 
scholars appeal to this congressional power as the linchpin of their justification of the 
Supreme Court's far-reaching authority over American life. Their theory maintains that 
by failing to deny the Court the authority to rule on certain issues, the people consent to 
the results. See C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 18-19, 37-39, 77-79; M. PERRY, supra note 1, 
at 128-35. 
Regardless of the legal logic of this position, it does not square with the case I have 
been making. My major reason for giving the legislature the final say is not that legisla-
tors are electorally accountable to a majority which has the right to have its own way. 
Rather, it is that when the legislature is driven to address, deliberately and squarely, an 
issue of constitutional policy, the judgment which the legislators make is likely to be 
sounder than the contrary view of the judges. From that perspective, the jurisdictional 
technique is an even cruder and less suitable instrument than formal amendment. See 
Lupu, Constitutional Theory and The Search for the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON 
L. REV. 579, 609-18 (1983); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Constitu· 
tional Limits on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 
HARV. L. REv. 17, 39-42 (1981). Simply because the Congress is thoroughly persuaded 
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qualms about conferring any such power on the state legisla-
tures, both from general disenchantment with the deliberative 
capacities of state governments and because of the fear that cer-
tain state legislatures would respond to majorities who do not 
necessarily adhere to the values spelled out in the national con-
stitution. For many people, reflection on what might have hap-
pened after Brown u. Board of Education•or, had Mississippi had 
a legislative override on fourteenth amendment issues is sober-
ing enough to discredit the entire notion. 
The fact that the prospect of a legislative override did not 
evoke comparable disquiet in Canada is a testimonial to the 
great difference between the Canadian and American concep-
tions of federalism. Canadians did not see the non obstante 
power as one that could safely be entrusted to the government 
in Ottawa, yet not to the governments in Quebec City, Victoria, 
or other provincial capitals. Our experience with provincial gov-
ernments has been different from the United States' experience 
with state governments in the last thirty years: provincial gov-
ernments have much broader responsibilities, and they tend to 
institute more progressive policies relative to their state counter-
parts in the United States. Even if this were not the case, as a 
practical political matter the non obstante power had to be 
· given to the provinces, because the objections to full entrench-
ment that had to be dealt with came from the provincial 
governments. 
The fear persists, however, that a particular province could 
abuse this power. Canadian history contains several unhappy ex-
amples of local majorities' willingness to use their provincial 
governments to invade the rights of minorities, where they 
would not likely have been successful with the national govern-
ment, which responds to a broader, more heterogeneous constit-
uency.106 This, however, does not imply that we should never al-
that the Court has gone awry on a certain point is no reason why it should silence the 
judges in the entire legal area, depriving itself of the federal judicial branch as the in-
strument for administration of this part of the law and leaving the subject to the vagar-
ies of 50 state courts. Those who believe that Congress, not the Court, should have the 
last word on the Bill of Rights, would prefer a non obstante power which allows an 
authoritative pronouncement on a specific issue that has bothered Congress. As it has 
come to be interpreted, the commerce clause of the United States Constitution appears 
to give Congress such a role. See P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DECISIONMAKING 145-48 (2nd ed. 1983). 
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
106. I have already referred to the treatment of the French-Catholics in Manitoba. 
While Prime Minister Laurier refused to intervene because of his commitment to the 
principle of provincial autonomy, certainly he would not have countenanced such a sub-
stantive policy emanating from the national government. Similar blots on Canadian his-
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low the political process of any province to override what it 
deems misguided judicial policy. An alternative safeguard would 
be to allow the national political branch of government to over-
turn the provincial exercise of the non obstante power in those 
rare cases in which the provincial initiative is egregiously offen-
sive. Serendipitously, that political option is actually available 
under the current Canadian Constitution.107 While it would raise 
local hackles, Ottawa should be prepared to scrutinize the use by 
provincial legislatures of their non obstante authority and to 
disallow any instances of flagrant denial of basic human rights to 
"discrete and insular minorities" within their boundaries. 
EPILOGUE 
For better or for worse, Canada did stumble on this distinctive 
constitutional partnership between court and legislature for the 
protection of fundamental rights. While its merits are appraised 
here from the point of view of constitutional theory, the acid 
test will be not logic but experience. How will the rights of 
Canadians actually fare under the new Charter? It is much too 
tory include the treatment of the Chinese by the province of British Columbia and of the 
Jehovah Witnesses by the Province of Quebec. See generally T. BERGER, supra note 11. 
Nevertheless, the criminal justice system, a perennial sore spot in states' rights over civil 
rights issues in the United States, does not pose a comparable problem in Canada be-
cause, under § 91(27) of the British North America Act, the national government has 
exclusive law-making authority in relation to criminal law and procedure. 
107. Our original highly centralized federal system gave the national government in 
Ottawa a general authority under § 90 of the British North America Act to "reserve and 
disallow" any provincial law of which it disapproved. Historically, the major use of this 
power was to control provincial economic initiatives which conflicted with Ottawa's com-
mercial policies and the influential businesses which benefited from them (e.g., disallow-
ance of Manitoba's railroad legislation in the 19th century and Alberta's "social credit" 
response to the depression of the thirties). See J. MALLORY, SOCIAL CREDIT AND THE FED· 
ERAL PowER IN CANADA, 8-24, 169-80 (1954). As our federal system matured and provin-
cial governments grew in stature, disallowance of their laws was seen to be illegitimate, 
and this federal power has fallen into near desuetude since World War II. See P. HOGG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, 39, 142-143, 151 (1977). 
The power, however, was not forgotten. While historically Ottawa rarely used this 
power to protect the fundamental rights of provincial minorities, in 1978 the Trudeau 
Government offered to delete the provision from a proposed new Canadian Constitution 
if, but only if, the provinces agreed to accept judicial restraints under a constitutionally 
entrenched Bill of Rights. See Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1978, § 131(3). That offer 
was not taken up. Section 33 of the new Charter of 1982 preserves the ultimate sover• 
eignty of provincial legislatures vis-a-vis the courts. This history makes a plausible case 
for the revival of the disallowance power in the special context of human rights. In this 
context one could not apply the usual criticism that the provinces are kept in a state of 
tutelage to the national government, whereas the appropriate source of control over their 
policies should be the provincial electorate. 
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early to tell. Our lower courts have heard hundreds of Charter 
claims in the last year and a half, upholding a significant propor-
tion of them. One of the most intriguing suits brought to date is 
a challenge to the testing of the Cruise missile, on the grounds 
that this will deprive Canadians of "life, liberty, or security" 
without regard to the "principles of fundamental justice."108 
When that litigation produced front page headlines in the fall of 
1983, 109 many Canadians realized for the first time what a major 
transformation was taking place in our political landscape. 
As yet, however, we have not heard from the Supreme Court 
of Canada, whose views about the actual force of the new consti-
tution will ultimately carry at least as much weight as did the 
views of the government leaders who wrote it. 110 In any event, 
108. See Operation Dismantle, Inc. v. The Queen, [1983) 1 F.C. 429 (Trial Div.), 
rev'd, 3 D.L.R.4th 193 (Fed. Ct. App.), leave to appeal granted, [1983) 2 S.C.R., at x 
(Can.). 
109. See Ottawa Appeal Ruling on Cruise, The Globe and Mail, Sept. 20, 1983, at 1. 
Another notable decison was Re Service Employees' Int'l Union, Local 204, 4 
D.L.R.4th 231 (Ont. High Ct. J. Div. Ct. 1983), which held that "freedom of association" 
under § (2)(d) of the Constitution Act included the right to join a trade union, to engage 
in collective bargaining, and even to strike. In this case the Divisional Court merely 
found that the Ontario program to limit compensation increases for Ontario public em-
ployees under the Inflation Restraint Act, 1982, did not provide sufficient justification 
under § 1 of the Charter for the blanket denial of the right to bargain collectively (and 
either to strike or to arbitrate) about noneconomic employment conditions. Some broad 
language in the judges' reasoning, however, led a few unions to speculate about chal-
lenges to general laws restricting public employees' right to strike, politicians to respond 
that they would use their authority under § 33 of the Charter to override any such judi-
cial verdict, and civil liberties lawyers, in turn, to deplore any intrusion upon the judicial 
prerogative to define the scope and limits of rights in Canada. See Bayefsky, A Catch In 
The Charter That Could Erode Rights, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 19, 1983, at 7. 
It is doubtful whether Canadian courts are prepared to second-guess a government's 
public sector labor policy in that fashion, see Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale 
and Dep't Store Union, Local 580, [1984) 3 W.W.R. 481 (B.C. Ct. App.); Public Serv. 
Alliance of Can. v. Government of Can. (Fed. Ct. App. June 26, 1984); but if one did, this 
is precisely the kind of situation in which a popularly elected legislature should legiti-
mately be able to use this Charter escape valve (assuming the legislature disagrees with 
the Court on the merits of the issue). In my view, this form of political safeguard against 
provincial abuse of the non obstante power is much better than a final say for Canadian 
judges, which even now some lawyers are trying to implant in § 33 of the Charter. See 
Note, 61 CAN. BAR REV. 391 (1983). 
110. I should emphasize that neither the words of the document nor the intentions of 
its authors can dictate the stand which the judges take about the Constitution, because 
these interpretive directions are themselves part of the original materials whose legal 
force is at issue. This fundamental jurisprudential stance must ultimately rest on a polit-
ical theory about why we think certain rights should have a preferred status and why the 
courts should have a special role in nurturing them. See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 493-
97. That is why it is terribly important that Canadians understand the reasons why they 
have a Charter, and why it took the specific form that it did, in deciding how they should 
exercise their respective responsibilities under the new regime, whether as judge, legisla-
tor, lawyer, or citizen. (Since this was written, the Supreme Court has issued its first 
major decision indicating that it will read the Charter provisiO!JS in a generous, purposive 
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Americans interested in how a different kind of constitutional 
formula might work should find Canada a fruitful area for com-
parative study in the next decade and beyond. 
Unfortunately, a black cloud is visible on the Canadian hori-
zon, casting a shadow that I have so far omitted from this rather 
sunny account. It developed in the area of the intractable lan-
guage problem. In negotiating the final terms of the Charter, 
Pierre Trudeau adamantly refused to extend the non obstante 
provision to minority language rights, especially with regard to 
the language of education in the provinces. With his lifelong 
dream of harmonious relations between French and English Ca-
nada now so close to constitutional fruition, the Prime Minister 
would not allow these rights to be exposed to the vagaries of the 
political process, especially since he knew that the Parti 
Quebecois-newly elected with a solid legislative majority in 
Quebec-would be swift in using this power to protect its quite 
different views about language policy.111 
Although it was understandable, Trudeau's stance was unfor-
tunate. For one thing, it became the primary reason for the Parti 
Quebecois' rejecting the constitutional Accord of November, 
1981-the only one of eleven provincial governments to do so. 
As Premier Levesque phrased it in the Quebec National Assem-
bly, "no self-respecting Quebec government could ever abandon 
the smallest fraction of this absolutely fundamental right to pro-
tect the only French island in the English-speaking sea of the 
North American continent."112 Thus, when the Queen finally 
brought the Canadian constitution to Canadian shores on April 
17, 1982, Ottawa celebrated; in Quebec City, however, the flags 
were flown at half-mast. On the heels of this event came the 
most highly publicized judgment so far rendered under the 
way. See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (Can. Sept. 17, 1984).) 
111. Actually, Trudeau did relent to the extent that Quebec was given the power 
(under § 59 of the Constitution Act, 1982) to decide when to entrench the right (under § 
23(1)(a)) of English-speaking Quebecers to send their children to English schools. This 
constitutional right, however, was not of great moment because most of its beneficiaries 
already had such a statutory right under the Quebec Charter of the French language. 
Nevertheless, Trudeau stubbornly refused to permit the province to use § 33 to override 
the new constitutional right of Canadian citizens moving to Quebec to send their chil-
dren to English schools, which § 23(1)(b) had provided in its grant to the Quebecois of 
the corollary right to have French-language education when they moved elsewhere in 
Canada. I might add that Trudeau's willingness to concede a provincial veto relating to 
freedom of speech and equal protection, and his adoption of the same legal escape hatch 
for Ottawa (something the dissenting provinces were not insisting upon as part of the 
November 1981 Accord), indicate that the entrenchment of language rights had always 
been Trudeau's real constitutional priority. 
112. 26 JOURNAL DES DtBATS,4 (Nov. 9, 1981). 
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Charter which struck down the crucial "Quebec clause" in the 
Charter of the French Language, on the ground that it could not 
be "justified in a free and democratic society."113 All in all, this 
was hardly an auspicious debut for a constitutional project origi-
nally aimed at strengthening the bond between Quebec and 
Canada. 
An immediate rejoinder, of course, is that one cannot justify 
overriding the fundamental rights of the individual, even in the 
pursuit of national unity. That stance ignores the depressing 
fate of the rest of the Charter rights in Quebec. Because it was 
113. See Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Quebec (No. 
2), 140 D.L.R.3d 33 (Que. Super. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.4th 573 (Que. 1983). The deci-
sion in this case will not ease the minds of those who are concerned about the quality of 
judicial evaluation of public policy issues under the Charter. The court had before it all 
the information available: the parties to the litigation called as expert witnesses a num-
ber of prominent scholars in the field. Furthermore, the opinion was written by Chief 
Justice Deschenes, who, having delivered a series of key judgments on this issue in the 
last decades, is deeply versed in the subject of language rights. Unfortunately, the final 
product did not live up to its potential. In a long and elegantly worded judgment, the 
Chief Justice spent ten pages summarizing the broad range of demographic, educational, 
and other points made by each side. Id. at 79-88. Then he took, literally, just a couple of 
sentences to reach his conclusion that Quebec did not really need to limit this language 
right in the Canadian Charter because English Canadians moving to Quebec would pro-
duce only a negligible influx into English-language schools, just slightly braking the 
steady decline in the size of that system. Id. at 89. From that bare assertion, the Chief 
Justice moved quickly to strike down this key symbolic feature of the Parti Quebecois' 
language policy. 
Worse, there was a wealth of material that could have been marshalled in support of 
his conclusion. Right now, experts project that the French share of the Quebec popula-
tion will become possibly as high as 86.5% by the year 2001, and in Montreal as high as 
79%. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15, at 301, Table 8-2. Meanwhile, 
the economic handicap of being French is quickly being erased: the earnings advantage 
of the unilingual Anglophone male over the unilingual Francophone in Montreal dropped 
from 1.93 in 1961 to 1.59 in 1970 to 1.20 in 1977, of the bilingual Anglophone from 1.99 
to 1.63 to 1.46, and even of the bilingual Francophone from 1.41 to 1.36 to 1.32. See J.A. 
BOULET, LANGUAGE AND EARNINGS IN MONTREAL 23-28 (1980). In Quebec as a whole, the 
English-French income differential among male workers dropped from 28% in 1971 to 
20% in 1978. See S. ARNOPOULOS & D. CLIFT, supra note 21, at 239, Table 14. It is also 
clear from the timing of this data that the new language law had little to do with these 
favorable trends (which have continued since then. The English-French differential 
among male workers dropped to 14% in Montreal in 1980, to 4% in the rest of Quebec, 
and the gap for women has effectively been closed as well. See J.A. BOULET & L. LAVAL-
LEE, L'EVOLUTION DES DISPARITE LINGUISTIQUE DE REVENU DE TRAVAIL AU CANADA DE 
1970-1980, at 10, 21 (1983)). Thus Bill 101 could safely be relaxed under the Charter of 
Rights without any threat to the integrity of Quebec's overall language policies. My 
qualms, then, about the judgment concern not its result but rather the process by which 
the Chief Justice got there, particularly because this is one of the best, most sophisti-
cated Charter decisions that I have thus far read. (Since this was written, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the Deschenes ruling, see 54 National Reporter 196 (1984), but on a 
narrower "interpretivist" ground, see supra text accompanying notes 27-42, which the 
Court felt was appropriate for the carefully drafted and detailed wording of the lan-
guage-of-education provision in the Charter.) 
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able to portray the Canadian Charter as merely the latest in a 
long series of alien regimes imposed on Quebec by Les Anglais, 
the Parti Quebecois found it politically easy to pass a blanket 
non obstante provision applicable to all existing Quebec legisla-
tion. 114 Since 1982, the Parti Quebecois has included a similar 
override in every statute it has enacted, beginning with Bill 63, 
an Act dealing with sugar refineries.116 By taking the initiative 
immediately, before the Charter had time to put down roots in 
Quebec political life, and by making use of the non obstante 
formula a matter of legislative routine, the Parti Quebecois was 
able to remove all the political hazard of invoking the formula 
for particular laws, thus frustrating the entire scheme of the 
Charter. The unfortunate by-product, then, of the battle be-
tween Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque about language rights 
is that the judicial-legislative dialogue about all other funda-
mental rights now getting underway in the rest of Canada has 
been effectively denied to Quebecers-French and English alike. 
Ottawa, unfortunately, has done nothing to repair this 
damage. 116 
114. Bill 62, An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, was introduced in the 
Quebec National Assembly in May 1982, and in June it passed the Assembly and re-
ceived royal assent. See Scott, Entrenchment By Executive Action: A Partial Solution 
To "Legislative Over-Ride," 4 SuP. CT. L. REV. 303, 309-10 (1982). This Bill purported to 
reenact every law then on the statute books with an added "notwithstanding the Char-
ter" clause. A fair argument can be made that this is legally insufficient, because both 
the wording and the spirit of § 33 of the Charter seem to require a specific judgment by 
the legislature about each law which it wishes to override. Compare Malartic Hygrade 
Gold Mines Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of Quebec, 142 D.L.R.3d 512 (Que. 1983) with 
Alliance Des Professeurs du Montreal v. Attorney-General of Quebec, 5 D.L.R.4th 157 
(Que. 1983). Nevertheless, even if the judges insist on this hurdle, it will simply add to 
the time and paperwork required of a government that is politically determined upon 
this result. 
115. See Scott, supra note 114, at 310. 
116. I argued earlier, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, that a Charter of 
Rights is especially necessary within a parliamentary system of government because 
strict party discipline creates the risk that the party in power might quickly push 
through a massive invasion of fundamental rights without having to overcome the checks 
and balances of a congressional system. One could read this argument in support of the 
proposition that one should not run the risk of abuse of a non obstante authority within 
a parliamentary system, and the recent Quebec experience might seem to confirm that 
concern. 
In principle, I agree that a non obstante power poses greater problems within the par-
liamentary model. In practice, though, I believe the risks are quite small in Canada, 
because of the political obstacles to overriding a very popular Charter. Quebec is the 
exception which proves the rule. The problem there was not the content of the Charter 
of Rights, but rather the fact that the Parti Quebecois was able to paint it as an alien 
constitutional document imposed on Quebec by les Anglais and that Quebecers were 
assured that they could continue to rely on their own provincial Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms. 
Be that as it may, my own defense of the non obstante idea assumed that it should not 
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Sadly, this contretemps was all unnecessary: if the new lan-
guage rights had only been left to Quebec to adopt voluntarily or 
to reject through the override, it is unlikely that the Parti 
Quebecois would have eviscerated the rest of the Charter as it 
did. Although such a concession would have denied some 
Canadians moving to Quebec the kind of educational choice for 
their children that I, for one, think they should have, 117 that sit-
uation was not inevitably permanent. The Parti Quebecois gov-
ernment appears now to be in grave political difficulty. Its likely 
successor, the Quebec provincial Liberals, will almost certainly 
accept this feature of the Charter once elected. 
Some observers will conclude from this episode that a govern-
ment cannot be trusted with the non obstante power. I draw a 
be exercisable in normal parliamentary fashion; rather, I would have preferred a "sober 
second thought" procedure under which § 33 would have to be invoked twice, before and 
after an election. See supra note 99. Instead, the drafters added § 33(3), a "sunset" 
feature under which non obstante provisions lapse every 5 years. Because the Parti 
Quebecois is now far behind in the political polls, see A Dream Fades in Quebec, 
MACLEAN's, Feb. 6, 1984, at 10-11, and the new leader of the front-running Quebec Lib-
eral Party is not opposed to the Charter, even its language provisions, see Lewis, Return 
from the Depths, MACLEAN's, Oct. 24, 1983, at 12-13, there is reason to hope that the 
Quebec National Assembly will not renew Bill 62 et al in 1987. 
11'1. I need not belabor the reasons why individual families want freedom of choice 
about the language of education for their children, especially the right to choose English 
if they are living in North America. On the other side, exercise of this right by Canadian 
citizens poses no practical threat to the future of the French language in Quebec. The 
evidence in Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. v. Attorney-General of Quebec (No. 
2), 140 D.L.R.3d 33 (Que. Super. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.4th 573 (Que. 1983), see supra 
note 113, indicated that without the benefit of the "Canada clause" in the Charter, the 
English language school population in Quebec would range from 4.8 to 9.4 % of the total 
by 2001, while even with that institutional support, the range would be only 9.4 to 
12.9%. See R. LACHAPELLE & J. HENRIPIN, supra note 15, at 81. That roughly four per-
cent difference in the level towards which the English school population will be declining 
in the next two decades could hardly be said to be of major concern in the province's 
language policy. 
Nor could one assert that this is really a matter of principle to the effect that if a 
family moved to French-speaking Quebec, it should expect that its children would go to 
the French public schools (just as they would in France). Actually, the Parti Quebecois 
has always been prepared to grant freedom of access to its English schools to Canadians 
moving from other provinces but has preferred to use this as a bargaining chip to force 
the provision of comparable facilities for Quebecois who move to these other provinces. 
See Magnet, supra note 25, at 200-01. Now the Charter settles that reciprocity issue by 
requiring all Canadian provinces to provide minority language education in either 
French or English where the number of children warrant it. See Constitution Act, 1982, 
§ 23(3). Moreover, while the Supreme Court of Canada decision in the appeal of Quebec 
Ass'n of Protestant School Bds. was pending, the Parti Quebecois amended its own lan-
guage laws to provide such access as a matter of statutory, if not constitutional, right. 
See Wilson-Smith, Levesque's Unfulfilled Promises, MACLEAN's, Nov. 28, 1983, at 34-35. 
All in all, my own qualms about this entire episode are not about the substantive intru-
sion of the Charter on Quebec language policy, but rather about the process through 
which this was accomplished. 
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rather different lesson. When a nation confronts the grand ques-
tion of how best to protect fundamental rights in a democracy, 
what it needs even more than moral purity is political artistry. 
By that standard, the new Canadian version as yet deserves only 
mixed reviews. 
